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§0.  Introduction 
 
The Íåbara Bhå∑ya is the oldest surviving commentary on the PËrvam¥måµså SËtra. Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya is remarkable for various reasons. Íabara here expresses ideas which differ from those of 
most of his contemporaries. Most remarkable is the absence of any reference whatsoever to the 
ideas of rebirth and liberation. Íabara's Bhå∑ya deals with Vedic ritual, which as a rule leads to 
heaven. 
 The absence of ideas which yet pervade much of Indian thought from the days of the early 
Upani∑ads onward could be explained by the conservative nature of PËrvam¥måµså. As a matter 
of fact, most of Vedic literature is not concerned with rebirth and liberation either, and the 
Upani∑ads themselves reveal that this doctrine was an innovation. It may not necessarily have 
been accepted by all sacrificing Brahmins, and indeed, later texts such as the Mahåbhårata show 
very little awareness of rebirth and liberation in their narrative parts, even though there can be no 
doubt that these texts are more recent than the early Upani∑ads. One might therefore think that the 
new ideas of rebirth and liberation took a long time to find general acceptance, and that 
conservative Brahmins at the time of Íabara — i.e., in the fifth or sixth century C. E. — still did 
not accept them. Indeed, Íabara's commentator Prabhåkara still has no place for liberation in the 
seventh century C. E., whereas his other commentator Kumårila opens up to this idea at around 
                                                
* I thank Roque Mesquita for help and advise. 
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the same time. 
 All this fits in with the general picture according to which the belief in rebirth and 
liberation did not originate within Vedic Brahmanism. This belief originally belonged to others, 
and found its way into the Vedic Upani∑ads from outside, as is indeed confirmed by some 
Upani∑adic passages. Vedic Brahmanism, far from being the source of these ideas, resisted them 
for some thousand years after their first appearance in the Upani∑ads. Seen in this way, the 
positions of Íabara and Prabhåkara constitute additional evidence for the originally non-Vedic 
character of the belief in rebirth and liberation. 
 This simple and elegant way of understanding the spread in time of the belief in rebirth 
and liberation in India is jeopardised by certain ideas about the early history of the Vedånta 
philosophy. It is well known that the Vedånta philosophy — which is to be distinguished from 
the Upani∑ads upon which it claims to be based — played no role in the philosophical debates of 
the early centuries of the common era. For centuries debates took place, and were recorded, 
between Såµkhyas, Naiyåyikas, Vaiße∑ikas and various schools of Buddhism, without any 
reference to the Vedånta philosophy. The first mention of this school of thought by others may 
well occur in the Madhyamakah®daya, a text belonging to the sixth century whose author was a 
Buddhist called Bhavya. This absence of evidence for Vedånta as a school of philosophy might 
be interpreted as evidence for its relatively late appearance.1 
 In spite of this, a number of scholars are of the opinion that Vedånta as a system of 
philosophy was there right from the beginning, that is to say, right from the period immediately 
following the early Upani∑ads. The Vedånta philosophy, for which the name Uttaram¥måµså is 
sometimes used, was, according to these scholars, part of original M¥måµså, which covered both 
PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså. Together they constituted at the beginning one single school of 
thought. Some extend this idea, and maintain that this single school of thought originally had one 
basic text, the M¥måµsåsËtra. This original text had two parts: the former or first part of the 
M¥måµsåsËtra, and the latter or second part of the M¥måµsåsËtra; in Sanskrit: PËrva-
M¥måµsåsËtra and Uttara-M¥måµsåsËtra. The later expressions PËrvam¥måµså and 
Uttaram¥måµså can then be explained as having (erroneously) evolved from these book-titles. 
 It is easy to see that the view according to which the Vedånta philosophy was in the 
beginning inseparably linked to PËrvam¥måµså contradicts the idea that PËrvam¥måµså for a 
long time was not interested in liberation and related concepts. The Vedånta philosophy, we must 
assume, has always been interested in liberation, through knowledge of Brahman. If the two 
                                                
1 Frauwallner (1992: 173) represents a different point of view, which however is not very plausible: “In den 
folgenden Jahrhunderten (i.e., in the centuries following the composition of the BrahmasËtras, presumably already 
before the Common Era, JB) beschäftigte man sich damit, das System Bådaråyaˆas weiter auszugestalten und 
auszudeuten. Aber alles da liess sich mit den Leistungen der gleichzeitigen grossen philosophischen Schulen nicht 
vergleichen. Daher blieb das Vedånta-System zunächst unbeachtet und wurde auch in der Polemik dieser Schulen 
kaum einer Erwähnung wert gefunden.” 
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schools of thought were originally one, we are virtually forced to conclude that the earliest 
ritualistic M¥måµsakas were also convinced Vedåntins. The abandonment by PËrvam¥måµså of 
the ideal of liberation would then be a later development within the school, a development which 
soon, with Kumårila, yielded again to the lure of liberation. 
 It will be clear that the idea of an original unity of PËrvam¥måµså and Uttaram¥måµså 
raises serious questions. It is therefore justified to ask what evidence it is based on. Several 
arguments have been presented in the secondary literature. The present article will deal with 
them. 
 
 
§1.  Were the PËrva- and Uttaram¥måµså originally one system? 
 
Hermann Jacobi remarked in 1911 that “at Íabarasvåmin's time the PËrva and Uttara M¥måµså 
still formed one philosophical system, while after Kumårila and Ía∫kara they were practically 
two mutually exclusive philosophies”.2 This remark, if true, has rather troubling consequences. It 
raises the general question what this single philosophical system at the time of, and before, 
Íabara may have looked like. More in particular, it raises the specific question why Íabara shows 
no awareness of the notion of liberation in his commentary on the ritual M¥måµsåsËtra, as 
observed by several scholars (Biardeau, 1964: 90 n. 1; Halbfass, 1980: 273 f.; 1991: 300 f.; 
Bronkhorst, 2000: 99 f.).3 Uttara M¥måµså has, presumably from its beginning, always been 
about liberation through knowledge of Brahma. Is Íabara's silence in this regard to be explained 
by the presumed fact that he left this issue to the part of the single philosophical system that he 
adhered to but which he had no occasion to comment upon? Or does it simply show that he did 
not accept the notion of liberation, or even that he was not, or barely, aware of it? 
 Jacobi's remark is cited with approval by Asko Parpola (1981: 155) in an article which 
tries to establish that not only were PËrva and Uttara M¥måµså originally one system, but that the 
fundamental texts of the two (the PËrva-m¥måµsåsËtra and the Uttara-m¥måµsåsËtra 
                                                
2 Jacobi, 1911: 18 [576]. 
3 Cp. Halbfass, 1991: 301: “the M¥måµså carries the heritage of the ‘prekarmic’ past of the Indian tradition into an 
epoch for which karma and saµsåra have become basic premises. As well as their counterpart, mok∑a, the concepts 
of karma and saµsåra do not play any role in the M¥måµsåsËtra and remain negligible in its oldest extant 
commentary, Íabara's Bhå∑ya.” Biardeau, 1968: 109: “[La M¥måµså] n'accepte, au moins à date ancienne, ni l'idée 
des renaissances ni celle d'une délivrance.” 
 Mesquita (1994) argues that both Jaimini and Íabara were concerned with liberation. For Jaimini he bases 
this opinion on the mention of the name Jaimini in the BrahmasËtra and in Ía∫kara's commentary thereon; this issue 
will be dealt with in § 6, below. Íabara's interest in liberation is presumably shown by his use of the expression 
ni˙ßreyasa in the Tarkapåda of his Bhå∑ya (Frauwallner, 1968: 16 l. 12). This expression by itself refers to 
“something that has no better”, i.e. to the best there is, without specifying whether in Íabara's opinion heaven or 
liberation is the best there is. Elsewhere Íabara explains that heaven (svarga) is happiness (pr¥ti) and that man makes 
efforts to attain happiness (see Bronkhorst, 2000: 104; Heesterman, 2003: 290 ff.); liberation is never mentioned. The 
conclusion is inevitable that for Íabara heaven is the best there is, and therefore that ni˙ßreyasa is svarga. 
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respectively) were originally the initial and final parts of one single text, the original 
M¥måµsåsËtra. He supports this claim with the testimony of classical authors, to which he adds 
an argument based on the teacher quotations in the two texts. 
 Reacting to Jacobi's remark, A. B. Keith already observed: “This, of course, would give 
the PËrvam¥måµså a very different aspect, as merely a part of a philosophy, not the whole”. 
Keith himself considered Jacobi's remark dubious, and believed that syncretism of the systems 
would rather be due to the commentators.4 It is indeed difficult to believe that the earliest 
M¥måµsakas, far from being the pure Vedic ritualistic thinkers that the texts present us with, 
were in their heart of hearts early Vedåntins, and that non-Vedåntic, ‘pure’ M¥måµsakas did not 
exist until later. At first sight this would appear to turn the historical development on its head.5 
The improbability of such a development does not, of course, in itself constitute proof that it may 
not have taken place. It does however justify us to review the evidence with great care. 
 
Jacobi bases his opinion to the extent that “at Íabarasvåmin's time the PËrva and Uttara 
M¥måµså still formed one philosophical system” on the fact that Íabara is mentioned in an 
important passage in Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya on sËtra 3.3.53. The passage needs to be 
studied in its context. This context is primarily provided by the sËtra 3.3.53 (eka åtmana˙ ßar¥re 
bhåvåt) which, in Ía∫kara's interpretation, establishes the existence of the self. In this context 
Ía∫kara states:6 
 
nanu ßåstrapramukha eva prathame påde ßåstraphalopabhogayogyasya 
dehavyatiriktasyåtmano 'stitvam uktam/ satyam uktaµ bhå∑yak®tå/ na tu tatråtmåstitve 
sËtram asti/ iha tu svayam eva sËtrak®tå tadastitvam åk∑epapura˙saraµ prati∑†håpitam/ ita 
eva cåk®∑yåcåryeˆa ßabarasvåminå pramåˆalak∑aˆe varˆitam/ ata eva ca 
bhagavatopavar∑eˆa prathame tantre åtmåstitvåbhidhånaprasaktau ßår¥rake vak∑yåma ity 
uddhåra˙ k®ta˙/ 
[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of 
enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the 
                                                
4 Keith, 1920: 473. 
5 It would not, of course, disagree with certain Indian traditionalists, who see the history of Indian thought as one of 
ongoing decline. Yudhi∑†hira M¥måµsaka (1987: Intr. p. 15-16), for example, speaks of the period of the teachers 
(åcårya-yuga) during which certain teachers, under the influence of Buddhists, Jainas and Cårvåkas, started 
neglecting the earlier writings of Ù∑is and Munis in order to press their own views. Y. M¥måµsaka mentions in 
particular Bhart®hari, Íabarasvåmin and Ía∫kara in this connection, Íabarasvåmin's innovation being to deny the 
existence of Brahma. (etasminn eva kåle Bhart®hariˆå Våkyapad¥yaprabh®tayo granthå viracayya ßabdådvaitavåda˙ 
pravartita˙, Íabara-svåminå ca brahmaˆa˙ sattåm apalapya PËrvam¥måµsåyå bhå∑yaµ viracitam, Bha††akumårilena 
ca Íåbarabhå∑ye Vårtikagranthå vilikhitå˙/ Ía∫karåcåryeˆa Bhart®hare˙ ßabdådvaitavådaµ bauddhadårßanikamatåni 
cånurudhya tato vå preraˆåµ labdhvå brahma satyaµ jagan mithyå j¥vo brahmaiva nåpara˙ iti matasya siddhyai 
vedåntadarßanasya bhå∑yaµ viracitam). See also Subrahmanya Sastri, 1961: BhËmikå p. 13 f. 
6 BSËBhå on sËtra 3.3.53 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 764 l. 9 - p. 765 l. 1); cp. Parpola, 1981: 153. 
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Íåstra, in the first Påda? 
[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the Bhå∑ya. But there (i.e., at the 
beginning of the Íåstra) there is no sËtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in 
BrahmasËtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, 
after an initial objection, by the author of the SËtra himself. And having taken it from here 
itself, Ócårya Íabarasvåmin has described [the existence of the self] in [the section] 
dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavar∑a in the first 
Tantra, when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented himself with saying: 
‘We shall explain this in the Íår¥raka’. 
 
The passage contains a number of puzzling expressions. It is particularly important to find out 
whether the expression "at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in the first Påda" (ßåstrapramukha 
eva prathame påde) is to be taken as referring to the same thing as "in the first Tantra" (prathame 
tantre), or not. Since "the first Tantra" is explicitly contrasted with and therefore differentiated 
from "the Íår¥raka" — the Íår¥raka being no doubt Upavar∑a's planned (or executed) commentary 
on the BrahmasËtra —, it seems safe to conclude that "the first Tantra" is the M¥måµsåsËtra (or 
Upavar∑a's commentary on it).7 Many interpreters (e.g. Deussen, 1887: 624; Thibaut, 1890/1896: 
II: 268; Gambhirananda, 1972: 740; Hiriyanna, 1925: 231; Kane, 1960: 120; Kane, HistDh 5(2), 
p. 1160; Parpola, 1981: 153; Ramachandrudu, 1989: 234-235; Bouy, 2000: 23 n. 92; 
Govindånanda and Ónandagiri on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53) identify “the very beginning of the Íåstra” 
with M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.5. But is this correct? Why should our short passage refer to one and the 
same discussion in three different ways: (i) “at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in the first Påda”, 
(ii) “in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition” and (iii) “in the first Tantra”?  
 We have to find out what Ía∫kara meant by "the beginning of the Íåstra". Related to this 
is the question whether Ía∫kara looked upon M¥måµsåsËtra and BrahmasËtra as together 
constituting one Íåstra, or as two different Íåstras. Jacobi and Parpola, as we have seen, invoke 
the passage under discussion to prove that the two together were originally one Íåstra, but their 
proof may be, at least in part, circular: The two disciplines were originally one because Ía∫kara 
refers to the M¥måµsåsËtra as "the beginning of the Íåstra", and "the beginning of the Íåstra" 
must refer to the M¥måµsåsËtra because the two disciplines were originally one. How do we get 
out of this circular argument? 
 There is another passage in Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya which may throw light on his 
                                                
7 Cf. Kane, HistDh 5(2), p. 1160: “Ía∫karåcårya refers to the extant PËrvam¥måµså as Dvådaßalak∑aˆ¥ in his bhå∑ya 
on VedåntasËtra III.3.26, as ‘Prathamatantra’ in bhå∑ya on V.S. III.3.25, III.3.53 and III.4.27, as Prathama-kåˆ∂a in 
bhå∑ya on V.S. III.3.1, III.3.33, III.3.44, III.3.50, as Pramåˆalak∑aˆa in bhå∑ya on V.S. [2.1.1 and] III.4.42.” 
Similarly Kane, 1960: 120. 
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understanding of his own Íåstra. It occurs under sËtra 1.1.4 and reads:8 
 
evaµ ca sati “athåto brahmajijñåså” iti tadvi∑aya˙ p®thakßåstrårambha upapadyate/ 
pratipattividhiparatve hi “athåto dharmajijñåså” ity evårabdhatvån na p®thakßåstram 
årabhyeta/ årabhyamåˆaµ caivam årabhyate: “athåta˙ parißi∑†adharmajijñåså” iti, “athåta˙ 
kratvarthapuru∑årthayor jijñåså” itivat/ brahmåtmaikyåvagatis tv apratijñåteti tadartho 
yukta˙ ßåstrårambha˙ “athåto brahmajijñåså” iti/ 
Such being the case, it is proper to begin a separate Íåstra with the words “Then therefore 
the enquiry into Brahma” (BrahmasËtra 1.1.1) because it deals with that. For in case [this 
Íåstra] were to deal with injunctions that one has to know [Brahma], no separate Íåstra 
could be begun, because [the Íåstra of injunctions (viz. the M¥måµsåsËtra)] has already 
begun with the words “Then therefore the enquiry into Dharma” (M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.1). 
Something that has already begun would begin like this “Then therefore the enquiry into 
the remaining Dharma”, just like “Then therefore the enquiry into the purpose of the 
sacrifice and into the purpose of man” (which is a sËtra (4.1.1) that introduces a chapter of 
the M¥måµsåsËtra). But because knowledge of the identity of Brahma and åtman has not 
been stated (in the M¥måµså), the beginning of a [new] Íåstra in the form “Then therefore 
the enquiry into Brahma” in order to convey that [knowledge] is appropriate. 
 
As the translation shows, this passage lends itself easily to an interpretation in which the 
BrahmasËtra belongs to a separate Íåstra (p®thakßåstra), different from ritual M¥måµså. 
 There is more. According to Ía∫kara in his comments on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53 which we 
studied above, “the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the 
fruit of the Íåstra has [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Íåstra, in the first Påda”. 
The very first Påda of Íabara's Bhå∑ya on the M¥måµsåsËtra does indeed contain a long passage 
dealing with the existence of the self (edited in Frauwallner, 1968: p. 50 l. 5 - p. 60 l. 23; 
translated pp. 51-61). This self is, as a matter of fact, stated to be different from the body, but the 
passage says nothing about its being “capable of enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra”. The first Påda 
of Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, on the other hand, repeatedly deals with these issues. As a 
short example we can take the following statement from Ía∫kara's comments on BrahmasËtra 
1.1.4:9 
 
“aßar¥raµ våva santaµ na priyåpriye sp®ßata˙” iti priyåpriyasparßanaprati∑edhåc 
codanålak∑aˆadharmakåryatvaµ mok∑åkhyasyåßar¥ratvasya prati∑idhyata iti gamyate 
                                                
8 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 98 l. 3-7). 
9 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 72 l. 1-3). 
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From the denial of being affected by joy and sorrow expressed in the statement “Joy and 
sorrow do not affect the one without body” (Chåndogya Upani∑ad 8.12.1) we understand 
that the state of being without body, called liberation, is denied to be the effect of Dharma 
characterised as injunction. 
 
The “one without body” is the self. The present passage tells us that this self, which is without 
body, is capable of enjoying the fruit of the Íåstra, viz. liberation. 
 As an example of a short passage dealing with the existence of the self we can quote from 
Ía∫kara's comments on BrahmasËtra 1.1.1:10 
 
sarvo hy åtmåstitvaµ pratyeti, na nåham asm¥ti/ yadi hi nåtmåstitvaprasiddhi˙ syåt sarvo 
loko nåham asm¥ti prat¥yåt/ 
For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) self, and never thinks ‘I am not’. If the 
existence of the self were not known, every one would think ‘I am not’. (tr. Thibaut, 
1890/1896: I: 14) 
 
There are therefore good reasons to interpret the passage from Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya on 
sËtra 3.3.53 cited above in the following manner: 
 
[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of 
enjoying the fruits of the Íåstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the 
[present] Íåstra, in the first Påda [of the BrahmasËtra and its Bhå∑ya]? 
[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the [BrahmasËtra-]Bhå∑ya (i.e., 
by Ía∫kara himself).11 But there (i.e., at the beginning of the BrahmasËtra) there is no 
sËtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in BrahmasËtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, 
the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the author of 
the SËtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, Ócårya Íabarasvåmin has 
described [the existence of the self] in [the section of the M¥måµså Bhå∑ya] dealing with 
the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavar∑a in the first Tantra (i.e. 
in his commentary on the M¥måµsåsËtra), when he had to discuss the existence of the 
                                                
10 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 43 l. 1-2). 
11 The use of the third person to refer to one's own work finds a parallel, e.g., in Maˆ∂ana Mißra's Brahmasiddhi (e.g. 
p. 75 l. 4: vak∑yati; p. 23 l. 17: åha), and is particularly common where an author has himself composed a 
commentary on his own work. Compare in this context Medhåtithi's remark under Manu 1.4 (I p. 7 l. 28-29): pråyeˆa 
granthakårå˙ svamataµ paråpadeßena bruvate: ‘atråha’ ‘atra pariharanti’ iti “it is a well known fact that in most cases 
the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons, making use of such expression as 
‘in this connection he says’ or ‘they meet this argument thus’, and so forth” (tr. Jha, III p. 20, modified). Nowhere 
else in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya does Ía∫kara mention an ‘author of the Bhå∑ya’ (bhå∑yak®t; see Mahadevan, 
1971&1973: II: 723). 
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self, contented himself with saying: ‘We shall explain this in the Íår¥raka’. 
 
This way of understanding Ía∫kara's reference to the first Påda agrees with the way in which he 
refers to the first, second and third Adhyåyas. Wherever in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya he refers to 
Adhyåyas, they are Adhyåyas of his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya (or of the BrahmasËtra), numbered 
according to the position they have in his own work. Ía∫kara refers to the “first Adhyåya” at the 
very beginning of the second Adhyåya of his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya; here there can be no doubt 
that it concerns the first Adhyåya of the BrahmasËtra (Bhå∑ya), not of ritual M¥måµså. Similarly, 
the “second Adhyåya” referred to at the very beginning of the third Adhyåya and under 
BrahmasËtra 2.1.1 clearly refers to Ía∫kara's own second chapter (or to that chapter of the 
BrahmasËtra). The same applies to the “third Adhyåya” referred to at the beginning of chapter 
four and under BrahmasËtra 3.1.1.12 
 
Let us now turn to Íabara. The above passage shows that, in Ía∫kara's opinion, Íabara took a 
topic, or a passage, which belonged under BrahmasËtra 3.3.53 and placed it in his M¥måµså 
Bhå∑ya. The passage does not say what exactly he took, nor does it state that he took it from his 
own commentary on the BrahmasËtra. 
 Ía∫kara testimony loses most of its value in the light of Erich Frauwallner's (1968) 
analysis of Íabara's Bhå∑ya on M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.1-5. It is this portion of Íabara's Bhå∑ya that 
contains a discussion of the self in a section dealing with the means of valid cognition, as noted 
by Ía∫kara. However, both the discussion of the self and the section on means of valid cognition 
in which it finds itself belong to the so-called V®ttikåra-grantha. That is to say, they belong to a 
portion which Íabara's explicitly cites from another author, whom he calls the V®ttikåra. No one, 
not even Ía∫kara, claims that the V®ttikåra-grantha as a whole was taken from a commentary on 
BrahmasËtra 3.3.53; the fact that the V®ttikåra-grantha comments several M¥måµsåsËtras 
excludes this as a possibility. Within the V®ttikåra-grantha the section on the existence of the self 
is an insertion (Frauwallner, 1968: 109-110). This implies that if someone has taken this section 
from a commentary on BrahmasËtra 3.3.53, it was not Íabara, but the V®ttikåra. It is therefore 
excluded that Ía∫kara still knew a commentary by Íabara on the BrahmasËtra which presumably 
contained the passage which is now part of the V®ttikåra-grantha. Stated differently, it is open to 
question whether Ía∫kara knew more about Íabara than we do. 
 This may not be all that surprising. Even Kumårila, who commented upon Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya itself and is commonly regarded as having lived before Ía∫kara (Pande, 1994: 46-47), did 
                                                
12 The fact that Bhåskara on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. Dvivedin p. 6 l. 19-20) uses "in the first Påda" where Ía∫kara says "in 
the first Tantra" (ata evopavar∑åcåryeˆoktaµ prathamapåde åtmavådaµ tu ßår¥rake vak∑yåma iti) suggests that he 
already misinterpreted Ía∫kara. 
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no longer know the extent of the V®ttikåra-grantha (Jacobi, 1911: 15 (573) f.).13 Ía∫kara's 
incorrect attribution of the discussion of the self to Íabara is therefore understandable. His claim 
to know where this passage came from, on the other hand, is no more reliable than this incorrect 
attribution. 
 Since Frauwallner's analysis may not be generally known, I cite here the most relevant 
passage (1968: 109-110): 
 
Der ganze V®ttikåragrantha˙ ist, im grossen gesehen, folgendermassen aufgebaut. Nach 
der Besprechung der Erkenntnismittel ergreift ein Gegner das Wort und bringt eine Reihe 
von Gründen gegen die Glaubwürdigkeit des Veda vor. Die späteren Kommentatoren 
nennen diesen Abschnitt Citråk∑epavåda˙, weil der Gegner von der vedischen Vorschrift 
“citrayå yajeta paßukåma˙” ausgeht. Die Antwort lautet zunächst im Anschluss an das 
SËtram 5, dass der Veda glaubwürdig ist wegen der Naturgegebenheit der Verknüpfung 
von Wort und Gegenstand. Das wird weit ausholend besprochen: Wesen des Wortes, 
Gegenstand des Wortes, Wesen der Verknüpfung und ihre Naturgegebenheit. Dann wird 
nochmal auf die Angriffe des Gegners im Citråk∑epa˙ zurückgegriffen und sie werden der 
Reihe nach widerlegt. Damit ist die ganze Auseinandersetzung abgeschlossen. 
 In die abschliessende Zurückweisung des Citråk∑epa˙ ist nun eine lange 
Erörterung über das Vorhandensein einer Seele eingefügt. Dass es sich dabei um einen 
sekundären Einschub handelt, zeigt schon das grobe Missverhältnis im Umfang dieses 
Einschubs gegenüber dem ganzen Abschnitt. Die ganze übrige Widerlegung des 
Citråk∑epa˙ umfasst nur 16 Zeilen, der Einschub 133 Zeilen. Ebenso krass ist die 
Äusserlichkeit der Einfügung. Auf diese lange Abschweifung folgt plötzlich ganz 
unvermittelt noch eine kurze Erwiderung auf einen der Einwände im Citråk∑epa˙, so dass 
der Leser zunächst erstaunt fragt, wovon denn eigentlich die Rede ist. 
 
This analysis clearly shows that the portion on the soul is an insertion into the V®ttikåragrantha, 
and not into Íabara's commentary. Ía∫kara obviously had it wrong.14 
 There is less reason to be sceptical with regard to Ía∫kara's statement about Upavar∑a. 
There is no reason to doubt that Ía∫kara knew a commentary by Upavar∑a on the M¥måµsåsËtra 
in which its author stated: “We shall explain [the existence of the self] in the Íår¥raka”. What 
does this prove? 
                                                
13 Yoshimizu's contribution to this volume shows that Kumårila subsequently changed his mind about the extent of 
the V®ttikåra-grantha. 
14 Regarding Ía∫kara's date, see Slaje's contribution to this volume, fn. 1 (just before 700 C.E.). Slaje (fn. 61) also 
gives a survey of opinions as to Íabara's date, which does not however take into consideration that Íabara was not 
yet known to Bhart®hari (Bronkhorst, 1989), so that it is highly unlikely that Íabara lived before the fifth century 
C.E. 
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 It seems plausible to conclude from this that Upavar∑a commented, or intended to 
comment, on both the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra. Does this mean that he “seems to 
have treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work” (Nakamura, 1983: 398 n. 4, 
referring to Belvalkar)? This is far from certain. We know that another author, Maˆ∂ana Mißra, 
wrote treatises both on M¥måµså and on Vedånta around the time of Ía∫kara, and yet it cannot 
be maintained that he treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work. Not much later 
Våcaspati Mißra commented upon works belonging to a variety of schools of thought. The fact, 
therefore, that Upavar∑a commented (or wanted to comment) upon the classical texts of two 
schools of thought does not, in and by itself, prove that he looked upon these as fundamentally 
the same, or upon their classical texts as really being parts of one single text. Indeed, the very 
circumstance that he speaks in this connection of “the Íår¥raka” suggests that he did not look 
upon that work as simply a later part of the same commentary. And the fact that Ía∫kara speaks 
about Upavar∑a's ‘first Tantra’ without further specification while referring to his commentary on 
the M¥måµsåsËtra may simply suggest that Ía∫kara did not know Upavar∑a's commentary on the 
BrahmasËtra. 
 The analysis of Ía∫kara's statements does not, therefore, provide us with reliable evidence 
that would allow to conclude that until Ía∫kara, and more particularly at the time of Upavar∑a 
and Íabara, the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra were looked upon as parts of one single 
work. Even less do these statements prove that the two systems of thought that find expression in 
those texts were believed to be in reality just one system of thought. 
 
Only one classical Sanskrit author appears to have made a statement suggesting that the two SËtra 
texts were originally part of one undivided text. This author is Sureßvara. 
 Sureßvara is an early commentator, and apparently also a direct disciple, of Ía∫kara (EIP 
III p. 420 ff.; Hacker, 1951: 1918-19 (= (12)-(13); Ungemach, 1996). His Nai∑karmyasiddhi 
contains a critique of M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 åmnåyasya kriyårthatvåd ånarthakyam atadarthånåµ ... 
“Since the Veda is for [ritual] activity, [passages] that are not for that are without purpose ...”. 
Sureßvara (p. 52; introducing verse 1.91; cp. Alston, 1959: 65-66; Maximilien, 1975: 43-44) 
states: 
 
yad api jaimin¥yaµ vacanam udghå†ayasi, tad api tadvivak∑åparijñånåd evodbhåvyate/ 
kiµ kåraˆam/ yato na jaiminer ayam abhipråya åmnåya˙ sarva eva kriyårtha iti/ yadi hy 
ayam abhipråyo 'bhavi∑yat ‘athåto brahmajijñåså/ janmådy asya yata˙’ ity evamådi 
brahmavastusvarËpamåtrayåthåtmyaprakåßanaparaµ gambh¥ranyåyasaµd®bdhaµ 
sarvavedåntårtham¥måµsanaµ ßr¥macchår¥rakaµ nåsËtrayi∑yat/ asËtrayac ca/ tasmåj 
jaiminer evåyam abhipråyo yathaiva vidhivåkyånåµ svårthamåtre pråmåˆyam evam 
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aikåtmyavåkyånåm apy anadhigatavastuparicchedasåmyåd iti/ 
Also the words of Jaimini which you present, they too are based on an incorrect 
understanding of his intention. For Jaimini did not intend to say that the whole Veda is for 
[ritual] activity. Indeed, had this been his intention, he would not have 
composed the sËtras of the venerable Íår¥raka,  viz.  athåto brahmajijñåså ,  
janmådy asya yata˙  (BrahmasËtra 1.1.1-2) etc., whose aim is to elucidate the real 
nature of the essence of Brahma and nothing else, and which is an investigation into the 
meaning of the Upani∑ads as a whole accompanied by profound reasoning. But he has 
composed those sËtras. Therefore Jaimini's intention is as follows: just as injunctive 
sentences are authoritative in their semantic space, in the same way too the sentences 
proclaiming the identity [of the self with Brahma], this because [both types of sentences] 
are equally limited to matters not known [from other sources]. 
 
It appears from this passage that Sureßvara believed that Jaimini the author of the M¥måµsåsËtra 
had also composed the BrahmasËtra.15 It is of course a small step from there to the position that 
both SËtra texts had once been one single text. Sureßvara maintained this common authorship 
even in the face of M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1, which he proposed to reinterpret in the light of Jaimini's 
“real” intentions. 
 No independent scholar could possibly accept Sureßvara's argument as it is presented in 
this passage.16 M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 constitutes, as a matter of fact, a major argument against the 
original unity of PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså. It is true that this sËtra — at any rate in Íabara's 
interpretation — presents a pËrvapak∑a, i.e., an opinion that will subsequently be discarded. But 
what is going to be discarded (from sËtra 1.2.7 onward) is not the position that the whole Veda is 
for ritual activity, but the conclusion that therefore passages that are not for ritual activity are for 
that reason without purpose. Sureßvara on the other hand claims that Jaimini did not intend to say 
that the whole Veda is for ritual activity, which is a position which seems difficult to defend, even 
though he was not the only Vedåntin to hold it. Sureßvara's reinterpretation of this sËtra — or 
more precisely: his rejection of the straightforward interpretation of this sËtra without offering 
something credible in its place17 — may therefore be understood to indicate that he attempted to 
impose a vision on the two M¥måµsås which does not easily fit the texts. 
 It goes without saying that M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 constituted a challenge for many 
                                                
15 Kane (1960: 135 f.; HistDh 5(2), p. 1174 f.) concludes that Jaimini had composed a Íår¥rakasËtra different from 
the present BrahmasËtra; similarly already Belvalkar, 1927. 
16 Parpola draws attention to Keith's (1920: xx f.) scepticism as to the value of this attestation. Hiriyanna (1925: 230) 
observed, similarly: “It would not ... be right to conclude on the strength of this passage alone ... that Sureßvara 
regarded Jaimini as the author of the Vedånta-sËtras.” 
17 Sureßvara repeats his position again in the immediately following sentence: “It is only the Vedic texts related to 
commands that bear on action” (adhicodanaµ ya åmnåyas tasyaiva syåt kriyårthatå; tr. Alston, 1959: 67).  
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Vedåntins. Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, for example, cites M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 in its 
introduction to BrahmasËtra 1.1.4, and subsequently enters in great detail to show that the 
Upani∑adic statements about Brahma do not prescribe activity, and are not to be construed with 
other statements that do. In the end Ía∫kara does not reject M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1, but he limits its 
range to such an extent that it cannot do much harm any longer:18 
 
tasmåt puru∑årthånupayogyupåkhyånådibhËtårthavådavi∑ayam ånarthakyåbhidhånaµ 
dra∑†avyam 
That is why the mention of purposelessness (in M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1) is to be understood 
as concerning arthavådas in the form of stories and the like that do not serve a human 
purpose (puru∑årtha) 
 
Padmapåda — like Sureßvara probably a pupil of Ía∫kara (Hacker, 1951: 1929-30 (= (23)-(24); 
Ungemach, 1996) and therefore a contemporary of the former — disagrees with Sureßvara where 
the authorship of the BrahmasËtra is concerned.19 He does so in the following passage:20 
 
sa ca svarËpåvagama˙ kasmin kathaµ veti dharmamåtravicåraµ pratijñåya tatraiva 
prayatamånena bhagavatå jaimininå na m¥måµsitam upayogåbhåvåt, bhagavåµs tu punar 
bådaråyaˆa˙ p®thakvicåraµ pratijñåya vyac¥carat samanvayalak∑aˆena. 
 
Venkataramiah (1948: 116) translates this as follows: 
 
And as to where or how the Vedic texts relating to the cognition of the existent entity 
(serve as a pramåˆa) is not explained by the revered Jaimini since in accordance with this 
resolve he set about investigating into the nature of Dharma only and since such 
knowledge (i.e., of åtman as distinguished from the body) is not to the purpose. But the 
revered Bådaråyaˆa on the other hand having resolved to inquire into a different topic 
altogether, has expounded (the subject of the separate existence of åtman) in the 
‘samanvayådhikaraˆa’ — [BrahmasËtra] I.1.1-4. 
 
Padmapåda's disagreement with Sureßvara in this respect does not change the fact that he, too, 
has to limit the range of applicability of M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1. He does so in the following 
                                                
18 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. Shastri p. 94 l. 1-2); see further §3.1 below. 
19 This was pointed out by van Buitenen (1956: 21 n. 57), who refers in this context to “Pañcapådika 40, 153-54” 
without indication what this means or what edition he has used; I presume that the passage cited here corresponds to 
the one intended by him. 
20 Pañcapådikå of Padmapåda, ed. S. Ír¥råma Íåstr¥ and S.R. Krishnamurthi Íåstr¥, p. 149-150. 
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passage:21 
 
nanu “d®∑†o hi tasyårtha˙ karmåvabodhanam”, “tadbhËtånåµ kriyårthena samåmnåya˙”, 
“åmnåyasya kriyårthatvåd” iti ca sarvasya kåryårthatvaµ darßitam? satyam; 
tatprakramabalåt tanni∑†ho vedabhåga iti gamyate, na sarvatra/ 
[Objection:] It has been shown in [Íabara on M¥måµsåsËtra 1.1.1 (Frauwallner, 1968: 12 
l. 12-13):] d®∑†o hi tasyårtha˙ karmåvabodhanam, [and in M¥måµsåsËtras 1.1.15:] 
tadbhËtånåµ kriyårthena samåmnåya˙ ... [and 1.2.1] åmnåyasya kriyårthatvåd ... that all 
[Vedic statements] have actions that are to be performed as purpose. 
[Reply:] True; because it begins with those [sËtras] (viz. athåto dharmajijñåså M¥mSË 
1.1.1, and codanålak∑aˆo 'rtho dharma˙ M¥mSË 1.1.2), the portion of the Veda that is 
related to those [notions] (i.e., dharma and codanå) is understood. [These notions] do not 
pertain to the whole [of the Veda]. 
 
Sureßvara himself, in his Sambandhavårttika on Ía∫kara's B®hadåraˆyakopani∑adbhå∑ya,22 points 
out that “in the M¥måµsåsËtra passage (1.2.1) ‘since scripture (åmnåya) has action as its subject’ 
the word ‘scripture’ refers only to the karmakåˆ∂a, not to the Upani∑ads” (EIP III p. 428). 
 
Returning now to Sureßvara's remark about the authorship of the BrahmasËtra, the fact that his 
passage stands alone, is not confirmed by others and is indeed contradicted by statements from 
other authors (among them Padmapåda), does not add to its credibility. It is therefore all the more 
surprising that Parpola (1981: 150) cites this passage — without translation and without 
discussion — as supporting evidence for the hypothesis that “the founder of the M¥måµså [is to] 
be credited with the authorship of a treatise upon the Vedånta, which the [present BrahmasËtra] 
would have replaced, not without thereby utilizing some of its elements”. Note that Parpola's 
conclusion goes well beyond Sureßvara's evidence. Sureßvara's remark, if correct, would show 
that Jaimini was the author of the BrahmasËtra, not — pace Kane, Belvalkar (see note 15) and 
Parpola — “of a treatise upon the Vedånta, which the [present BrahmasËtra] would have 
replaced, not without thereby utilizing some of its elements”. This artificial interpretation of 
Sureßvara's words by these modern scholars, including the postulated existence of an early 
Vedåntic work by Jaimini, finds its explanation in the fact that the extant BrahmasËtra is 
obviously a far more recent work than the ritual M¥måµsåsËtra and dates from a time many 
centuries after the late-Vedic period; its references to other systems of thought which did not yet 
                                                
21 Padmapåda's Pañcapådikå, ed. S. Subrahmanyaßåstri, p. 344. 
22 § 268-288. See esp. § 272-273: kriyåprakaraˆasthånåµ vidhiße∑åtmanåµ satåm/ vacasåm akriyårthånåm 
ånarthakyåya tad vaca˙// na tËpani∑adåµ nyåyyaµ pårthagarthyasya saµbhavåt/ pËrvoktenaiva nyåyena nåtas 
tadvidhiße∑atå//. 
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exist in the late-Vedic period leave little doubt in this regard (see Jacobi, 1911: 13 [571] f.). 
However, it seems a lot more reasonable to take Sureßvara's remark at its face value and conclude 
that it is mistaken, rather than take it as a justification to postulate the existence of an earlier 
composition for which no independent evidence exists. 
 
Let us now consider some further passages that have a bearing on the relationship between ritual 
M¥måµså and Vedånta. Råmånuja introduces his Ír¥bhå∑ya on the BrahmasËtra in the following 
manner (I p. 2): 
 
bhagavadbodhåyanak®tåµ vist¥rˆåµ brahmasËtrav®ttiµ pËrvåcåryå˙ sañcik∑ipu˙, 
tanmatånusåreˆa sËtråk∑aråˆi vyåkhyåsyante/ 
Earlier Ócåryas have condensed the extensive BrahmasËtra V®tti composed by the 
venerable Bodhåyana. The sounds of the sËtras will be explained in accordance with 
their/his opinions. 
 
It is not clear from this statement whether Råmånuja still knew the long commentary of 
Bodhåyana or only the condensed versions prepared by the Ócåryas he mentions.23 Mesquita 
(1984: 179-180) surmises that he knew Bodhåyana's commentary in fragmentary form; this 
would explain that there are only seven quotations from this V®tti, all from the first Adhyåya, in 
the Ír¥bhå∑ya. When, therefore, Råmånuja cites a few pages later an unspecified V®ttikåra, it is 
not fully clear whether the author cited is Bodhåyana (which seems probable), or someone else. 
The unspecified V®ttikåra is cited in the following passage (I p. 4):24 
 
tad åha v®ttikåra˙/ “v®ttåt karmådhigamåd anantaraµ brahmavividi∑å” iti/ vak∑yati ca 
karmabrahmam¥måµsayor aikaßåstryaµ: “saµhitam etat ßår¥rakaµ jaimin¥yena 
∑o∂aßalak∑aˆena iti ßåstraikatvasiddhi˙”/ 
The V®ttikåra states this [in the following words]: “After the knowledge of karma which 
has been acquired, there is desire to know Brahma.” And he will state that 
                                                
23 Råmånuja's Vedårthasaµgraha (§93; van Buitenen, 1956: 128; Matsumoto, 2003: 39) refers to “old commentaries 
on [Veda and] Vedånta, accepted by recognised scholars, [and composed] by Bodhåyana, Èa∫ka, Drami∂a, 
Guhadeva, Kapardi(n), Bhåruci etc.” 
(bodhåyana†a∫kadrami∂aguhadevakapardibhåruciprabh®tyavig¥taßi∑†aparig®h¥tapuråtanavedavedåntavyåkhyåna-; 
some manuscripts omit °veda°). Råmånuja's predecessor Yåmuna mentions as commentators on the BrahmasËtra 
Drami∂a (some editions merely say bhå∑yak®t) and Ír¥vatså∫kamißra, and enumerates furthermore the following 
thinkers: Èa∫ka, Bhart®prapañca, Bhart®mitra, Bhart®hari, Brahmadatta, Ía∫kara, Ír¥vatså∫ka and Bhåskara 
(Ótmasiddhi p. 9-10; cf. Neevel, 1977: 66 ff., 100; Mesquita, 1979: 165-166). A seventeenth century work in the 
tradition of Vißi∑†ådvaita, Ír¥nivåsa's Yatipatimatad¥pikå (= Yat¥ndramatad¥pikå; p. 1), enumerates Vyåsa, 
Bodhåyana, Guhadeva, Bhåˆaruci, Brahmånandi(n), Dravi∂åcårya, Ír¥paråµkußa, Nåtha, Yåmunamuni, Yat¥ßvara 
etc. as the names of earlier teachers. For the twenty-one earlier commentators of the BrahmasËtra enumerated by 
Madhva, see Sharma, 1981: 98. 
24 Quoted Kane, 1960: 120 n. 2; HistDh 5(2), p. 1159 n. 1886; Parpola, 1981: 147 n. 7a. 
Vedånta as M¥måµså  15 
 
 
  
Karmam¥måµså and Brahmam¥måµså are one Íåstra, in the words: “This Íår¥raka has 
been joined with the sixteen-fold [composition] of Jaimini,25 and that proves that the two 
Íåstras are one.” 
 
Unlike Sureßvara, the V®ttikåra cited by Råmånuja does not appear to look upon the BrahmasËtra 
as a composition of Jaimini. His words rather create the impression that, according to him, the 
unity of the two Íåstras came about later, after the composition of their classical texts. Note 
further that these passages from Råmånuja's Ír¥bhå∑ya (unlike the Prapañcah®daya, to be 
considered below) do not state that either Bodhåyana or the V®ttikåra (who may well have been 
one and the same person) commented upon both the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra. 
 
Also the Prapañcah®daya, an anonymous work of unknown date,26 creates the impression that the 
two Íåstras were combined at some moment of time after the composition of their classical texts 
(p. 26-27 (38-39), ch. 4; cited Parpola, 1981: 146 n. 4; Kane, HistDh 5(2), p. 1159 n. 1886):  
 
tatra så∫gopå∫gasya vedasya 
pËrvottarakåˆ∂asaµbhinnasyåße∑avåkyårthavicåraparåyaˆaµ m¥måµsåßåstram/ tad idaµ 
viµßatyadhyåyanibaddham/ tatra ∑o∂aßådhyåyanibaddhaµ pËrvam¥måµsåßåstraµ 
pËrvakåˆ∂asya dharmavicåraparåyaˆaµ jaiminik®tam/ tadanyad adhyåyacatu∑kam 
uttaram¥måµsåßåstram uttarakåˆ∂asya brahmavicåraparåyaˆaµ vyåsak®tam/ 
The M¥måµsåßåstra reflects on the meanings of all sentences belonging to the Veda, 
PËrvakåˆ∂a and Uttarakåˆ∂a combined, along with its A∫gas and Upå∫gas. It has been 
composed in twenty chapters. Among these, the PËrvam¥måµsåßåstra composed in 
sixteen chapters,27 by Jaimini, reflects upon the Dharma connected with the PËrvakåˆ∂a. 
Different from that is the Uttaram¥måµsåßåstra, four chapters composed by Vyåsa,28 
                                                
25 The sixteenfold composition of Jaimini is no doubt the combination of the twelve chapters commented upon by 
Íabara with the four chapters known as Saµkar∑akåˆ∂a or Devatåkåˆ∂a; along with the four chapters of the 
BrahmasËtra this adds up to twenty chapters in total. It is noteworthy that the four chapters of the Devatåkåˆ∂a — 
which in the opinion of Råmånuja's V®ttikåra are part of the sixteenfold Karmam¥måµså — are united with the four 
chapters commented upon by Ía∫kara (i.e. with the BrahmasËtra) to account for an Uttaram¥måµså in eight chapters 
in the Sarva(darßana)siddhåntasaµgraha ascribed to (another) Ía∫kara, as noted in Hacker, 1947: 55. According to 
the Tattvaratnåkara the author of the Devatåkåˆ∂a is Kåßak®tsna; see Subrahmanya Sastri, 1961: Preface p. (iii), 
BhËmikå p. 5-6. 
26 Witzel (1982: 212) characterizes the Prapañcah®daya as a “im frühen Mittelalter, vielleicht noch vor Ía∫kara 
entstandene Enzyklopädie”. He gives no evidence for this claim: a note merely states that this text is already 
acquainted with the medical author Våha†a, so that it must date from after ca. 600 C.E. Witzel repeats this claim in a 
more recent publication (1985: 40: “wohl in die 2. Hälfte des 1. Jts. n. Chr. zu setzen”), adds however in a note (n. 19 
p. 66): “Parpola, (cf. WZKS, 25, p. 153 ff.), datiert den Text ins 11. Jht.” See further note 96, below. 
27 See note 25, above. 
28 Note that also Govindånanda's Bhå∑yaratnaprabhå on BrSBh 1.1.4 (p. 98) ascribes the BrahmasËtra to Vyåsa: 
uktar¥tyå brahmaˆa˙ svåtantrye saty eva bhagavato vyåsasya p®thak ßåstrak®tir yuktå ...; similarly Såyaˆa in the 
introduction to his Ùgveda Bhå∑ya (e.g., p. 10 l. 12), Våcaspati in the fifth introductory verse of his Bhåmat¥, KullËka 
Bha††a on Manu 1.8 and 21. Kauˆ∂a Bha††a in his VaiyåkaraˆabhË∑aˆa on verses 23 and 24 ascribes both the 
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which reflects upon Brahma of the Uttarakåˆ∂a. 
 
This same text adds that Bodhåyana and Upavar∑a commented upon the combined work (p. 27 
(39); cited Kane, HistDh 5(2), p. 1159 n. 1886; Parpola, 1981: 154 n. 37; M¥måµsaka, 1987: Intr. 
p. 27): 
 
tasya viµßatyadhyåyanibaddhasya m¥måµsåßåstrasya k®tako†inåmadheyaµ bhå∑yaµ 
bodhåyanena k®tam/ tad granthabåhulyabhayåd upek∑ya kiµcit saµk∑iptam upavar∑eˆa 
k®tam/ tad api mandamat¥n prati du∑pratipådaµ vist¥rˆatvåd ity upek∑ya 
∑o∂aßalak∑aˆapËrvam¥måµsåßåstrasya devasvåminåtisaµk∑iptaµ k®tam/ bhavadåsenåpi 
k®taµ jaimin¥yabhå∑yam/ punar dvikåˆ∂e dharmam¥måµsåßåstre pËrvasya 
tantrakåˆ∂asyåcåryaßabarasvåminåtisaµk∑epeˆa saµkar∑akåˆ∂aµ dvit¥yam upek∑ya 
k®taµ bhå∑yam/29 
Bodhåyana wrote a commentary, called K®tako†i, on the [entire] M¥måµsåßåstra 
composed in twenty chapters. Because the great bulk of [that] work was frightening, 
Upavar∑a abridged it by omitting some things. Considering even that to be difficult to 
understand for the dull-witted on account of its extent, Devasvåmin wrote a much 
abridged [commentary] pertaining only to the PËrvam¥måµsåßåstra defined by the [first] 
16 [chapters]. Bhavadåsa, too, wrote a commentary upon [this] work of Jaimini's. Again, 
Ócårya Íabarasvåmin wrote, with much abbreviation, a commentary upon the first of the 
two kåˆ∂as of the Dharmam¥måµsåßåstra, Tantrakåˆ∂a, omitting the second 
Sa∫kar∑akåˆ∂a. (tr. Parpola, 1981: 153-154; modified) 
 
It is hard to determine with certainty the extent to which the accounts of the Prapañcah®daya are 
trustworthy. Yudhi∑†hira M¥måµsaka (1987: Intr. p. 29-30) has pointed out that according to 
various early testimonies K®tako†i, far from being the name of a commentary, is another name for 
Upavar∑a. He further draws attention to the fact that the Prapañcah®daya, while mentioning 
Brahmadatta and Bhåskara as commentators on the BrahmasËtra,30 does not mention Ía∫kara.31 
                                                                                                                                                        
BrahmasËtra and the Yogabhå∑ya to Vyåsa. Cf. further Kane, 1960: 129 ff.; HistDh 5(2), p. 1166. Vyåsa is also 
mentioned at Upadeßasåhasr¥ Padyabandha 16.67, but the editor and translator of this passage believes that “[i]n 
Ía∫kara's works Vyåsa indicates the author of the Sm®tis and not Bådaråyaˆa, the author of the B[rahma] S[Ëtra]” 
(Mayeda, 1979: 159 n. 41; cp. 1965: 187; 1973: 40-41). Yåmuna bases an argument on the presumed identity of 
Vyåsa the author of the Mahåbhårata and Vyåsa the author of the BrahmasËtra; see Neevel, 1977: 56. MadhusËdana 
Sarasvat¥'s Vedåntakalpalatikå sometimes mentions Vyåsa (p. 2 verse 4), sometimes Bådaråyaˆa (p. 12), apparently 
referring to one and the same person. The fact that the Prapañcah®daya elsewhere (p. 46 (67)) identifies Bådaråyaˆa 
and Vyåsa has not received sufficient attention in the secondary literature. 
29 The passage continues (cited M¥måµsaka, 1987: Intr. p. 27): tathå ca devatåkåˆ∂asya saµkar∑eˆa/ 
brahmakåˆ∂asya bhagavatpådabrahmadattabhåskarådibhir matabhedenåpi k®tam/ tathå ßåbarabhå∑yaµ 
våkyårthabhedam abhyupagamya bha††aprabhåkaråbhyåµ dvidhå vyåkhyåtam: tatra bhåvanåparatvena 
bha††akumåreˆa, niyogaparatayå prabhåkareˆa. 
30 See the preceding note. 
Vedånta as M¥måµså  17 
 
 
  
Christian Bouy (2000: 24 n. 96), moreover, reminds us that according to Vedåntadeßika, 
Bodhåyana and Upavar∑a appear to be one and the same person.32 
 However that may be, the Prapañcah®daya does not tell us that PËrva- and Uttara-
M¥måµså were originally one system. It rather suggests that at some point in time efforts were 
made to combine the two fundamental texts — the M¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra — in 
order to create one single system. Bodhåyana and Upavar∑a (whether one or two persons) may 
have played a role in this attempt. Judging by later developments, this attempt did not meet with 
lasting success. Devasvåmin and other commentators returned to a separate treatment of the 
M¥måµsåsËtra, the commentators mentioned by Råmånuja and others apparently confined 
themselves to the BrahmasËtra. 
 
We must conclude from the evidence so far considered that the testimony from later authors does 
not support the hypothesis that the PËrva- and the Uttara-M¥måµså originally were one system, 
even less that the PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµsåsËtra were originally part of one single work. The 
following sections will bring to light that all the available evidence agrees as well — in fact, 
better — with an altogether different hypothesis, the hypothesis namely that at least some 
Vedåntins at some point of the history of this current of thought made a effort to turn themselves 
into, or become recognised as, some kind of M¥måµsakas, different from the ritual M¥måµsakas, 
but M¥måµsakas none the less, this because these Vedåntins, too, followed the same strict rules 
of Vedic interpretation as the ritual M¥måµsakas. 
 
 
§2.   Vedåntins who are not M¥måµsakas 
 
The question we have to address at this point is the following: why should a philosophy that 
draws its inspiration from the Upani∑ads consider itself a form of M¥måµså? This would at first 
sight only make sense if M¥måµså were some kind of philosophy. The fact is that it isn't. Ritual 
M¥måµså, at any rate, never was a philosophy until later thinkers of the school — primarily 
Kumårila Bha††a and Prabhåkara — adopted philosophical positions in their confrontations with 
                                                                                                                                                        
31 This is surprising in view of the fact that the author of the Prapañcah®daya may have been an Advaitin, as might 
follow from the following statement (p. 17 (23)): nirupådhikas tanubhuvanaprapañcapratibhåsarahito 
nityaßuddhabuddhamuktaparamånandådvaitabrahmabhåvo mok∑a˙; see also his characterisation of the fourth chapter 
of the BrahmasËtra (p. 29 (42)): caturthe sakalasaµsåradu˙khånåµ niv®ttilak∑aˆam 
åtmådvaitabrahmamåtramok∑aphalam. It is on the other hand surprising that the last two chapters of the 
Prapañcah®daya (prakaraˆas 7 and 8) extensively deal with Såµkhya and Yoga. 
 It is here to be noted (i) that Ía∫kara may have thought that Íabara had also composed a commentary on the 
BrahmasËtra, as we have seen above, and (ii) that Íabara refers twice (on PMS 10.4.32; 12.2.11) to the 
Sa∫kar∑akåˆ∂a in his M¥måµsåbhå∑ya, without clear indication to the effect that he himself had composed a 
commentary on it. 
32 Cf. Mesquita, 1984: 181-82 n. 9. 
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thinkers of other schools. Until that time ritual M¥måµså was a school of Vedic hermeneutics. 
The whole of Íabara's Bhå∑ya contains very little that one might be tempted to call ‘philosophy’ 
and all the more that is Vedic interpretation. In other words, a philosophy that shares features 
with the teachings of the Upani∑ads and which draws its inspiration from these texts is not 
automatically a form of M¥måµså. 
 Let us not forget that ritual M¥måµså is not a school of ritual practice that invokes the 
Veda in order to justify its practices. The texts present the situation the other way round. 
M¥måµså describes the manner in which an openminded student reacts to the teachings of the 
Veda. That is to say, a properly qualified student learns the Veda by heart and also comes to 
understand its meaning. He is in this way confronted with injunctions, which tell him that he must 
carry out certain ritual acts. Realising that these injunctions cannot but be correct, he now knows 
that he has to sacrifice and does so. Combining these injunctions with other injunctions and with 
different Vedic statements, our student finds out how exactly to perform these sacrifices. If in this 
way he is going to perform the same sacrifices which his elders had performed before him, this is 
not, strictly speaking, because he imitates his elders, but because he, individually, has been 
confronted with the same Vedic injunctions as had his elders before him. 
 If we apply this way of thinking to Vedånta as M¥måµså — for which the passages cited 
in §1 above use various names: Íår¥raka-, Vedåntårtha-, Brahma- and Uttara-M¥måµså —, we 
find that this cannot be merely a philosophy which justifies its tenets by invoking the Veda. In 
order to be a form of M¥måµså, the situation has to be reversed here too. Any qualified person is 
free to invoke passages from the Veda to support this or that position, and later thinkers maintain 
that all the Sm®tis are in fact based on the Veda. This does not however turn these Sm®tis into 
M¥måµså. In order to be a form of M¥måµså, Vedånta thought must claim to directly derive from 
the Veda. In fact, the expression “Vedånta thought” or “Vedånta philosophy” is dubious in this 
connection; it is no doubt more correct to speak of the “Vedåntic transformation” that is claimed 
to affect the qualified student who correctly studies the Veda. 
 At this point it is important to recall that Vedåntic M¥måµså, in order to be a form of 
M¥måµså, has to describe the reaction of the learner to the whole of the Veda, not exclusively the 
Upani∑ads. Since no Vedåntic M¥måµsaka, to my knowledge, has ever rejected ritual M¥måµså 
for being totally mistaken, Vedåntic M¥måµså presents itself as a superstructure on top of ritual 
M¥måµså. This does not necessarily entail that every M¥måµsaka must also be, or have been, a 
ritualist (even though many Vedåntic M¥måµsakas adopted this position). It means that they fully 
recognise that many Vedic statements require those who study them to perform sacrifices; the 
knowledge obtained from Upani∑adic statements may annul these injunctions for certain adepts 
(this is the opinion of several Vedåntic M¥måµsakas, among them Ía∫kara), but this does not 
change the fact that those Vedic injunctions in and by themselves require such behaviour. In other 
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words, Vedåntic M¥måµså in a certain way recognises ritual M¥måµså. 
 However, to come back to the point of departure, one may very well adhere to Vedåntic 
ideas without having a M¥måµså-like conception as to how a student of the Veda supposedly will 
undergo the effects of the relevant Upani∑adic statements. This is a very important point: there is 
no reason whatsoever to believe that all Vedåntins were M¥måµsakas, even Vedåntic 
M¥måµsakas. There is no theoretical reason to think so, and there are practical indications that 
there were indeed Vedåntins who recognised no link with M¥måµså. In the present section we 
will briefly consider testimony that shows that there apparently were, during the centuries 
preceding Ía∫kara, Vedåntins who did not consider themselves M¥måµsakas. These early 
Vedåntins held on to a position in which knowledge of Brahma was the precondition for 
liberation, they apparently believed that this position was the one also taught in the Upani∑ads 
(sometimes only their name would betray this), but they did not waste a word on what exact role 
the Veda played in obtaining this liberating knowledge. In other words, these Vedåntins were not, 
or at any rate did not present themselves as M¥måµsakas. 
 The first text here to be considered is the so-called Gau∂apåd¥yakårikå or Ógamaßåstra 
ascribed to Gau∂apåda, in whom later tradition sees the teacher of the teacher of Ía∫kara.33 It 
must here briefly be recalled that this ascription of the Ógamaßåstra to a single author is highly 
problematic. This text really consists of four treatises (prakaraˆa), already in the opinion of the 
Ía∫kara who commented upon all four of them, and about whose identity there is difference of 
opinion.34 The second of these four treatises (known by the name Vaitathyaprakaraˆa) refers at 
two occasions to the Upani∑ads (GK 2.12: vedåntavinißcaya; GK 2.31: vedånte∑u vicak∑aˆa) but 
contains no hint how, or indeed that, its doctrine is derived from the Upani∑ads. Its central 
message, that the objects of our waking consciousness are no more real than the objects seen in a 
dream, is presented as ‘handed down by tradition’ (sm®ta) in verse 2.4, rather than as ‘known 
from the Veda’ (ßruta ), which would metrically have been possible. The third treatise 
(Advaitaprakaraˆa) frequently mentions Brahma, but its point is not that Brahma can only be 
known through the Veda. The emphasis is on mental states without thought, sometimes called 
samådhi (3.37), sometimes asparßayoga ‘contactless Yoga’: “This is what is called ‘contactless 
Yoga’, very difficult to be looked at by all yogins; for the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where 
[in fact] there is no fear.”35 A further message of this treatise is that nothing can come into 
existence. This position is argued for in a series of verses (GK 3.20-28) with the help of both 
Upani∑adic references and logic (cp. Bronkhorst, 1999: 53 f.). The third treatise does also 
elsewhere refer to Upani∑adic passages (e.g. GK 3.11: taittir¥yake; 3.12: madhujñåne; etc.) but, 
                                                
33 Mahadevan, 1952: 2; but Hacker, 1951: 1922 (16). 
34 See Mayeda, 1968; Vetter, 1969a; 1978; Bronkhorst, 1991; King, 1995; Stephan, 2002: 29 ff.; Hanneder, 2003. 
35 GK 3.39: asparßayogo nåmai∑a (Bouy, 2000: 73, 181 reads vai nåma) durdarßa˙ sarvayogibhi˙/ yogino bibhyati hy 
asmåd abhaye bhayadarßina˙//. Tr. Bhattacharya, modified. Cp. Divanji, 1940; King, 1992; Slaje, 1994a. 
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like the second treatise, it does not suggest that the knowledge it communicates, or the aim it 
preaches, can only be obtained from the Upani∑ads by applying the principles of M¥måµså. Some 
of the themes of the third treatise (asparßayoga; and the idea that nothing can come into 
existence) recur in the fourth one (Alåtaßåntiprakaraˆa), with this difference that the fourth 
treatise heavily uses Buddhist ideas and terminology, so much so that the position can be, and has 
been, defended that this treatise was composed by a Buddhist. It is therefore open to question 
whether it was conceived as an expression of Vedåntic thought, and no trace of concern with the 
text of the Upani∑ads can, of course, be found in it. The first treatise, finally, is often considered 
as commenting upon an Upani∑ad, the Måˆ∂Ëkya Upani∑ad. However, the commentator Ía∫kara 
does not look upon this text as an Upani∑ad, as ßruti, and nor does the famous Ía∫kara who 
composed the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya ever cite this Upani∑ad (Mayeda, 1968: 81; Vetter, 1979: 34-
35).36 The first treatise itself contains no indication that its teaching is based on an Upani∑ad, nor 
on several Upani∑ads or on the Veda for that matter. Its emphasis is on the syllable OM, which is 
identical with Brahma, and knowledge of which leads to the highest goal: “He and no other 
person is a sage (muni) who knows OM which has no measure and yet has an unlimited measure, 
and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.”37 
 Another early Vedånta treatise — the Paramårthasåra of Ódiße∑a, which appears to be 
younger than the Ógamaßåstra and older than the Yuktid¥pikå38 (Danielson, 1980: 1-2) — is an 
even clearer example of Vedåntic thought in which the link with the Veda receives no attention 
whatsoever. Indeed, the word Vedånta itself occurs only in its concluding verse, in the compound 
vedåntaßåstra. Nothing else in the eighty-seven verses that make up this small treatise as much as 
suggests that the message it communicates has anything whatsoever to do with the Upani∑ads. On 
the other hand, Brahma is frequently mentioned, and it is made clear that knowledge of Brahma 
leads to liberation. 
 The Buddhist author Bhavya provides us with further early testimony regarding what he 
calls the Vedåntavådins.39 His testimony creates the impression that the school of philosophy that 
he describes was not much concerned with the details of Vedic interpretation that is characteristic 
                                                
36 With regard to Ía∫kara, Mayeda (1968: 82) observes: “It is strange but true that the commentator of the 
Gau∂apåd¥yakårikå keeps totally silent about the Måˆ∂Ëkyopani∑ad, even while commenting on its twelve prose 
sentences. Of course he has to cite to interpret it, but he does so as if it were a part of the Gau∂apåd¥yakårikå.” It is to 
be noted that a number of later authors refer to both the Måˆ∂Ëkya and the Gau∂apåd¥ya Kårikå as ßruti, and 
therefore as part of the Veda (Mayeda, 1968: 81 f.; Bouy, 2000: 33). Note further that “Íaµkara cite ..., dans son 
com[mentaire] sur les BrahmasËtra, [Gau∂apåd¥ya Kårikå] III.15 et I.16, en les attribuant respectivement au 
saµpradåyavid et au ‘maître’ (åcårya) vedåntårthasaµpradåyavid ([BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya] 1.4,14; II.1,9)” (Bouy, 
2000: 33 n. 154).  
37 GK 1.29: amåtro 'nantamåtraß ca dvaitasyopaßama˙ ßiva˙/ o∫kåro vidito yena sa munir netaro jana˙//. Tr. 
Bhattacharya. 
38 Nothing stands in the way of dating the Yuktid¥pikå in the second half of the sixth century C.E.; see Bronkhorst, 
2003. 
39 Earlier authors maintained that Bhavya quotes a verse from Gau∂apåda in his work and is therefore posterior to 
him, but this seems less certain now; cf. Bouy, 2000: 20 f. 
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of M¥måµså. Theirs was a school of philosophy, whose link with the Upani∑ads receives no 
attention whatsoever in Bhavya's exposition. What is more, we learn from Qvarnström's (1989: 
102 f.) study of the material that Bhavya believed that the Vedåntavådins had adopted or stolen 
their ideas from the Buddhists. Bhavya claims:40 “Being convinced that this infallible system of 
the Tathågata is a good one, here [in the Vedånta system] the heterodox sectarians, being desirous 
of [that doctrine], have therefore [even] made it their own.” This accusation, too, suggests that 
Bhavya was confronted with people or texts whose prime concern was not to derive their 
philosophy from Vedic texts. 
 Also the Jaina tradition has preserved a small text — dating perhaps from the sixth 
century and attributed to Siddhasena Divåkara — which presents a Vedåntic position. This text 
draws upon Upani∑adic and other Vedic sources, without however subjecting them to anything 
like a M¥måµså-like analysis.41 
 As a further example of Vedånta-like philosophising without excessive concern for Vedic 
hermeneutics the fifth-century thinker Bhart®hari may be mentioned. His Våkyapad¥ya appears to 
refer to Vedåntins once (trayyantavedina˙; Vkp 3.3.72), but there is no reason to think that 
Bhart®hari counted himself amongst them (cp. Houben, 1995: 293 f.; Bronkhorst, forthcoming). 
And yet Bhart®hari's thought resembles classical Vedåntic philosophy in many respects. Brahma 
is mentioned in the very first verse of the Våkyapad¥ya, and a few more times later on. Brahma is 
Bhart®hari's absolute, which is one, the totality of all there is.42 This totality is divided into unreal 
entities under the influence of the powers of Brahma. This is not, to be sure, identical in all details 
with the philosophy of Ía∫kara, or Gau∂apåda. Indeed, a major difference is that Bhart®hari never 
identifies the self with Brahma. Yet Bhart®hari's respect for the Veda is beyond doubt, and the 
resemblance of some of his notions with the ideas normally associated with Vedåntic thought is 
clear. But Bhart®hari does not present his views as the mere result of correct Vedic interpretation. 
 One more text must be mentioned here. The recent researches of Walter Slaje (esp. 1994) 
have made it probable that the original kernel out of which the Yogavåsi∑†ha developed was an 
independent work called Mok∑opåya, a work whose author and precise date remain unknown.43 
The attitude toward authority of the author of the original Mok∑opåya finds expression in the 
                                                
40 Madhyamakah®dayakårikå 8.86: tåthågat¥m avitathåµ matvå n¥tim imåµ ßubhåm/ tasmåj jåtasp®hais t¥rthyai˙ 
k®taµ tatra mamåpi tat//. Text and translation as in Qvarnström, 1989: 44, 91. 
41 Qvarnström, 2003. 
42 Cf. Bronkhorst, 1991a; 1998. The parallelism with the early Såµkhya notion of pradhåna is striking; see 
Bronkhorst, 2007. 
43 Regarding the date of the original Mok∑opåya Slaje makes the following observation (1994: 56): "Mit seinem 
erkenntnistheoretischen Illusionismus und seiner Lehre vom nicht wirklich Entstandensein der Erscheinungswelt 
(ajåtatva) könnte das Werk — historisch betrachtet — eine Nebenlinie zu Gau∂apåda (um 500), dem 
La∫kåvatårasËtra, und Maˆ∂ana (um 700) bilden." 
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following words:44 "Even when it has been composed by a human being, a treatise must be 
accepted if it teaches on the basis of arguments (yukti). [Everything] else, on the other hand, 
should be abandoned, even if it derives from seers (®∑i). One should exclusively adhere to rules of 
logic (nyåya). Statements supported by arguments (yukti) must be accepted even from a child. 
[Everything] else should be abandoned like [useless] grass, even if it has been uttered by [the 
god] Brahmå." And again:45 "Never and in no case should one be satisfied with the author of a 
treatise; one should be satisfied with the contents of the treatise, [on condition that] it provides 
experience supported by arguments (yukti)." These and many other passages allow us to conclude 
that the author of the Mok∑opåya was of the opinion that his philosophical position was not based 
on traditional authority, but supported by arguments presented in his text. This does not 
necessarily mean that he claimed to have created an altogether new philosophy, but he certainly 
was of the opinion that someone who was sufficiently informed about the world and who 
seriously considered the arguments concerned, would arrive at the same philosophy as he, quite 
independently of the tradition he might belong to. Which is this philosophical position? The 
author of the Mok∑opåya teaches a subjective illusionism, which denies the existence of a real, 
objectively existing world.46 The world is nothing beyond imagination; even the creator-god 
Brahmå is no more real than the model in the mind of a painter.47 All that exists is consciousness. 
 This is not the place to deal with the arguments which the Mok∑opåya presents to prove its 
view of the world (see Bronkhorst, 2001: 207 ff.). It is however important to note that its 
philosophy is in various respects close to Vedånta.48 Yet this text explicitly denies dependence on 
anything but logical reasoning. 
 
The texts considered so far can be looked upon as being more or less closely associated with one 
or more Vedåntic traditions that remained unconnected with M¥måµså. There are of course 
numerous other texts which preach Vedånta-like ideas without being in any way linked to 
M¥måµså.49 It serves no purpose in the present context to try to be exhaustive. However, mention 
                                                
44 YogV 2.18.2-3: api pauru∑am, ådeyam ßåstraµ ced yuktibodhakam/ anyat tv, år∑am api, tyåjyam; bhåvyaµ 
nyåyaikasevinå// yuktiyuktam upådeyaµ vacanaµ bålakåd api/ anyat t®ˆam iva tyåjyam, apy uktaµ padmajanmanå//. 
Cp. Slaje, 1994: 167.  
45 YogV 7.103.45: ßåstrakartari rantavyaµ na kadåcana kutracit/ ßåstrårtha eva rantavyaµ yuktiyuktånubhËtide//. The 
reading is the one adopted by Slaje (1994: 165) on the basis of supplementary manuscript-evidence. Where possible, 
I use the readings accepted by Slaje in his book Vom Mok∑opåya-Íåstra zum Yogavåsi∑†ha-Mahåråmåyaˆa (1994), 
or in his editions of Bhåskarakaˆ†ha's Mok∑opåya†¥kå (1993, 1995, 1996). I also follow Slaje in referring to the 
Uttarårdha of book 6 as book 7. 
46 E.g. YogV 6.95.16 (Slaje, 1994: 260 n. 230): jagadådi na vidyate. 
47 YogV 3.2.55: yathå citrak®danta˙sthå nirdehå bhåti putrikå/ tathaiva bhåsate brahmå cidåkåßåccharañjanam// 
(Slaje, 1994: 198) 
48 Cf. Chenet, 1998, 1999. 
49 Cp. Gonda, 1985: 82: “D'une manière générale, à travers toute l'histoire de l'hindouisme, on peut distinguer les 
penseurs plutôt philosophes et les fidèles sentimentaux. Les premiers ont tendance à croire à l'existence du seul 
Brahman et à son identité avec les âmes empiriques et la matière; ils estiment que la rédemption consiste en ceci que, 
par une vision directe, on fait l'expérience de l'unité éternelle du brahman et de l'âme ... Quant aux croyants plus ou 
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must be made of the relatively late Upani∑ads that were composed during the period that interests 
us. These texts propound Vedåntic ideas (such as “I am Brahma”) without basing themselves on 
the old Upani∑ads; they do not need to, because they present themselves as Upani∑ads. And yet 
these texts are younger than the early Upani∑ads, many much younger, some younger than 
Ía∫kara himself. It may here suffice to mention the so-called Saµnyåsa Upani∑ads, which have 
been studied in detail by scholars such as Sprockhoff (1976) and Olivelle (1992). The dates of 
these texts range from the last centuries preceding the common era to the fifteenth century C. E., 
according to Sprockhoff (1976). It is not impossible that some of these Upani∑ads have at a late 
date been “vedanticised” (Sprockhoff, 1976: 263), but this can hardly be true of all the Upani∑ads 
that have been composed during this period. Obviously the Vedåntic ideas of these and other 
Upani∑ads cannot be looked upon as some kind of M¥måµså, because these texts claim to be 
parts of the Veda themselves. Perhaps this claim was never meant to be taken too seriously — 
after all, these Upani∑ads were not part of the repertoire of traditional Veda reciters — but this 
would show all the more clearly that the Vedånta philosophy, in the opinion of many, could very 
well survive and thrive without a close link to the Veda of the traditional reciters. 
 Relatively early evidence for Vedånta-like ideas is also found elsewhere. Aßvagho∑a's 
Buddhacarita, for example, contains the following verse, put in the mouth of the future Buddha's 
teacher Arå∂a Kålåma (12.42): “For this purpose the Brahmans in the world, who follow the 
doctrine of the supreme Absolute (paramabrahma), practise here the brahman-course and instruct 
the Brahmans in it.” (ityarthaµ bråhmaˆå loke paramabrahmavådina˙/ brahmacaryaµ carant¥ha 
bråhmaˆån våsayanti ca//).50 
 
[The question of the relation of certain Vedåntic traditions with M¥måµså presents itself 
emphatically in connection with the school of Råmånuja. Gerhard Oberhammer (1997: 97) makes 
the following pertinent remarks: 
 
In der Darstellung der Geschichte der Råmånuja-Schule werden ihre Anfänge 
üblicherweise durch die Namen Nåthamuni, Yåmunamuni und Råmånuja charakterisiert, 
auch wenn einige verlorene Autoren dem Namen nach bekannt sind und erwähnt werden. 
Dadurch ergibt sich ein im Grunde eindimensionales Bild der Anfänge dieser Schule, das 
letztlich auch ihre historische Verflechtung in das philosophisch-theologische Geschehen 
der Zeit im Dunkeln lässt. Woher stammt die philosophische Tradition dieser Denker, von 
denen jedenfalls Yåmunamuni ein Påñcaråtrin gewesen sein dürfte, und wie war ihre 
                                                                                                                                                        
moins bhaktiques, ils insistent, avec la Bhagavadg¥tå, sur le fait que le Brahman est l'Ótman et le maître des êtres 
vivants, ...” Cf. Sheridan, 1986. 
50 Johnston, 1936: 133 (text); 174 (translation). Cp. Nakamura, 1955: 83 f.; 1983: 146 f. 
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Beziehung zur Vedånta-Tradition? Denn selbst bei der üblichen Darstellung der 
Geschichte der Schule fällt auf, dass im Grunde Råmånuja der erste Autor ist, der einen 
Kommentar zu den BrahmasËtren schreibt. Weder Nåthamuni noch Yåmunamuni haben 
einen solchen verfasst. Yåmunamuni kennt zwar die BrahmasËtren und zitiert sie. Er 
kennt sogar eine grosse Zahl von Kommentatoren der BrahmasËtren, man tut sich aber 
schwer vor Råmånuja von einer echten Vedånta-Tradition der Schule im engeren Sinne zu 
sprechen. Es fällt selbst schwer, genau zu bestimmen, woher Råmånujas eigene Vedånta-
Tradition kommt. Es ist bezeichnend, dass Råmånuja, wenigstens der Legende nach, 
Schüler eines Vedånta-Lehrers gewesen ist, nämlich Yådavaprakåßas, der mit seiner 
Lehre nicht dem Typus des Vißi∑†ådvaita angehört hat, wie er etwa bei Yåmunamuni 
fassbar ist. Die Anfänge der Vedånta-Tradition Råmånujas bleiben im Dunkel und können 
beim heutigen Stand der Forschung auch nicht geklärt werden. 
 
In view of the questions raised in this article, one may wonder to what extent Råmånuja's 
predecessors can be looked upon as Vedåntic M¥måµsakas.51 Roque Mesquita's researches (1990: 
19), for example, have led to the conclusion that Nåthamuni was of the opinion that God's 
existence had to be proved, not only on the basis of the Veda, but also with the help of inference. 
Yåmunamuni defended initially (e.g., in his Ótmasiddhi and Áßvarasiddhi) the same position, but 
abandoned the idea of a logical proof of the existence of God in his later works (Puru∑anirˆaya, 
Ógamapråmåˆya; see Mesquita, 1971; 1973: 187 f.; 1974: 188 f.; 1980: 203 f.). Vedånta as 
M¥måµså — as has been pointed out above and will further be shown below — allows no other 
means of obtaining liberating knowledge of Brahma, or of God, than the Veda. Vedåntic 
M¥måµså has no place for logical proofs of God, for it would no longer be a form of M¥måµså.] 
 
 
§3.   Vedåntins who are M¥måµsakas 
 
Beside those Vedåntins who do not show much concern with the details of Vedic hermeneutics, 
there are others who do. We will see that a number of Vedåntins did not just use the principles of 
M¥måµså in order to arrive at a correct interpretation of the Upani∑ads which they could then use 
to prove their philosophies right. They went further by presenting their philosophies as being 
themselves M¥måµså at heart. A correct use of the principles of M¥måµså, they argued, leads the 
qualified student to liberation through the knowledge of Brahma. These philosophers do not 
therefore present themselves, strictly speaking, as philosophers, a fact that has often been 
                                                
51 Cp. Oberhammer, 1971: 6. 
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overlooked in modern research.52 Modern research has therefore frequently dealt with questions 
such as that of the relationship between human reason and Vedic revelation in these thinkers.53 To 
the extent that these thinkers present themselves as M¥måµsakas (and we will see that they do not 
always stick to this position in all their writings), there can be no doubt that knowledge derived 
from the Veda must have priority over any form of reasoning. Being self-proclaimed 
M¥måµsakas they maintain, and have to maintain, that the Veda provides knowledge that cannot 
be obtained by any other means. Vedånta conceived of as M¥måµså is not a form of philosophy 
which uses various means of knowledge to establish its positions; quite on the contrary, it is  
Vedic interpretation which starts from the assumption that knowledge correctly derived from the 
Veda cannot but be correct itself.54 Let me hasten to add that the knowledge about Brahma that 
can be obtained from the Veda and from nowhere else is not just any kind of knowledge; for the 
student who is ripe for it, it is knowledge which liberates him from this world. 
 We have seen that by far not all Vedåntins have presented themselves as M¥måµsakas, 
and it seems a priori likely that Vedånta as M¥måµså was an innovation that was at some time 
made in certain Vedåntic circles. We may assume that the author or authors of the BrahmasËtra as 
well as the various commentators of this text only whose names have reached us belonged to 
those who welcomed this way of presenting Vedånta.55 In the following pages we will consider 
some of the thinkers of this kind whose works have survived. The earliest commentator on the 
BrahmasËtra whose work has been preserved is Ía∫kara. Let us examine his position in some 
detail. 
 
 
§3.1. Ía∫kara 
 
In the beginning of his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, Ía∫kara presents a justification of the way he 
interprets the Upani∑ads. Since this way would at first sight seem to be in contradiction with the 
M¥måµså methods of Vedic interpretation, he first presents the latter's point of view as a 
                                                
52 See however Mayeda, 1968a: 221: “Early Vedånta philosophers did not pay much attention to the epistemological 
and logical problems which were important, even essential, topics among other schools of Indian philosophy.” 
53 This question is explicitly thematised in works such as Murty, 1959; Brückner, 1979; Halbfass, 1991: ch. 5 
(“Human reason and Vedic revelation in Advaita Vedånta”; an earlier version of this chapter in Halbfass, 1983: ch. 
2). Krishna (2001: 94) protests, no doubt rightly, against the use of the term ‘revelation’ in this context. 
54 One is tempted to conclude from Våtsyåyana's laconic characterisation in the Nyåya Bhå∑ya of the Upani∑ads as 
being “mere knowledge of the self” (adhyåtmavidyåmåtra) and distinct from “investigative science” (ånv¥k∑ik¥) that 
he was acquainted with some form of early Vedåntic M¥måµså; see NBh p. 35 l. 3-4 (on sËtra 1.1.1). 
55 It is not clear to what extent all Vedåntins in the tradition of BrahmasËtra commentators considered themselves 
M¥måµsakas. Sureßvara's use, in his Nai∑karmyasiddhi 2.24, of the simple term m¥måµsaka to designate a follower 
of Kumårila Bha††a is suggestive in this respect; cp. Hacker, 1951: 1954 (48). There is however no doubt in the case 
of the most important ones: Ía∫kara calls his own work Vedåntavåkyam¥måµså under BSË 1.1.1 (and 
Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhå∑ya in the colophons); Bhåskara's commentary is called Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhå∑ya in a number 
of colophons; attention has been drawn in §1 to Råmånuja's use of the expression Brahmam¥måµså. 
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pËrvapak∑a:56 
 
kathaµ punar brahmaˆa˙ ßåstrapramåˆakatvam ucyate, yåvatå "åmnåyasya kriyårthatvåd 
ånarthakyam atadarthånåm" iti kriyåparatvaµ ßåstrasya pradarßitam/ ato vedåntånåm 
ånarthakyaµ, akriyårthatvåt/ kart®devatådiprakåßanårthatvena vå kriyåvidhiße∑atvaµ, 
upåsanådikriyåntaravidhånårthatvaµ vå/ na hi parini∑†hitavastupratipådanaµ saµbhavati, 
pratyak∑ådivi∑ayatvåt parini∑†hitavastuna˙, tatpratipådane ca heyopådeyarahite 
puru∑årthåbhåvåt/ ata eva "so 'rod¥t" ity evamåd¥nåm ånarthakyaµ må bhËd iti "vidhinå tv 
ekavåkyatvåt stutyarthena vidh¥nåµ syu˙" iti ståvakatvenårthavattvam uktam/ mantråˆåµ 
ca "i∑e två" ityåd¥nåµ kriyåtatsådhanåbhidhåyakatvena karmasamavåyitvam uktam/ ato 
na kvacid api vedavåkyånåµ vidhisaµsparßam antareˆårthavattå d®∑†opapannå vå/ na ca 
parini∑†hite vastusvarËpe vidhi˙ saµbhavati, kriyåvi∑ayatvåd vidhe˙/ tasmåt 
karmåpek∑itakart®devatådisvarËpaprakåßanena kriyåvidhiße∑atvaµ vedåntånåm/ atha 
prakaraˆåntarabhayån naitad abhyupagamyate, tathåpi 
svavåkyagatopåsanådikarmaparatvam/ tasmån na brahmaˆa˙ ßåstrayonitvam 
How [can] it be stated that the Veda (ßåstra) is the means of knowing Brahma, in view of 
the fact that it has been shown — (in M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 which reads:) ‘Since the Veda 
is for [ritual] activity, [passages] that are not for that are without purpose’ — that the 
Veda concerns [ritual] activity? The Upani∑ads are therefore without purpose, since they 
are not for [ritual] activity. Alternatively, they are adjuncts to injunctions [that prescribe 
ritual] activities in order to make known their agent, deity, etc.; or they are meant to 
enjoin other activities such as adoration. For it is not possible that they provide 
information about an existing thing, because an existing thing is the object of [other 
means of knowledge] such as perception, and because no human purpose (puru∑årtha) is 
served in providing information about [an existing thing], by which nothing is to be 
gained or lost. It is for this reason that, in order to avoid that [Vedic statements] like ‘He 
wept’ be without purpose, [such statements] are stated to serve a purpose in that they 
eulogise [an injunction], in (M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.7:) ‘Because they form one sentence with 
an injunction, they [serve a purpose] by eulogising injunctions’. Mantras such as i∑e två 
(TaitS 1.1.1) have been stated to be connected with ritual acts as being expressive of 
[ritual] activity and the means thereto. For this reason Vedic sentences are nowhere seen 
to have purpose except in connection with injunctions, nor would this be possible. Nor is 
an injunction possible that pertains to the existing aspect of a thing, because an injunction 
concerns an activity. It follows that the Upani∑ads are adjuncts of injunctions [that 
                                                
56 BSËBhå introducing sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 58 l. 6 - p. 61 l. 4). 
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prescribe ritual] activities by making known the own forms of the agent, deity etc. 
required by the ritual act. And if this is not accepted out of concern for the different 
contexts [of Upani∑ads and Vedic injunctions], they [must be accepted as] concerning 
adoration and other things mentioned in their own sentences. It follows that Brahma is not 
known from the Veda. 
 
This passage admirably presents, and in few words, what we know is the position of classical 
M¥måµså. In this position there is no place for information in the Veda about existing things. The 
Veda, not having been composed by fallible beings, cannot possibly contain incorrect 
information, and therefore no information that could be in conflict with other means of 
knowledge such as perception. For this reason it cannot contain information about what the world 
is like. However, it can and does contain information about what human beings must do, for this 
information cannot be obtained in any other way. The result is that injunctions have to be taken 
literally, whereas all other Vedic pronouncements may have to be understood metaphorically. 
 Ía∫kara does not agree with this. He claims that the principles of M¥måµså do not 
exclude that information about Brahma can be obtained from the Vedic texts. His logic is simple. 
He agrees with M¥måµså that the Veda can on no account be in conflict with other means of 
knowledge and that, therefore, the Veda can only provide information about things that we cannot 
gain information about in any other way. For M¥måµså the only things that fulfill this 
requirement are the injunctions. Ía∫kara argues that Brahma, too, falls in the same category: the 
only way to obtain knowledge about Brahma is through the Veda. 
 It is to be emphasised that Ía∫kara does not express disagreement with the basic 
principles of M¥måµså. On the contrary, he agrees with all of them.57 He only maintains that in 
applying these principles the traditional M¥måµsakas overlook something. They are, to be sure, 
right in thinking that the Veda should never be in conflict with other means of knowledge. They 
are also correct in maintaining that the injunctions, by their very nature, cannot be in conflict with 
any other means of knowledge and must therefore be taken literally. He only adds that the same 
reasoning applies to the passages that provide information about Brahma, for Brahma, too, cannot 
be known by any other means of knowledge.58 
 Ía∫kara sets out his arguments in a long passage, of which the following parts are most 
                                                
57 This idea is still present in the much more recent Ía∫kara legends. According to these, Maˆ∂ana Mißra was a 
M¥måµsaka who lost a debate with Ía∫kara. However, “[i]n ihm regte sich Zweifel, denn etwas konnte er nicht 
verstehen: Wie konnte der grosse Weise Jaimini, der selbst ein Schüler Vyåsas war, eine Lehrmeinung vertreten, die 
offensichtlich falsch und nicht im Einklang mit den heiligen Schriften war? Auch Ía∫karas grossartige Erklärungen 
konnten Maˆ∂anamißras Zweifel nicht ausräumen. Um letzte Gewissheit zu erlangen, richtete Maˆ∂anamißra seine 
Gedanken auf Jaimini, der daraufhin erschien und ihn davon überzeugte, dass Ía∫karas Advaita-Lehre nicht die 
Gültigkeit der ritualistischen M¥måµså-Lehre ausschliesse, sondern diese in sich begreife” (Ungemach, 1996: 301). 
58 The central role of the ßruti constitutes what Michael Comans calls the “method of early Advaita Vedånta” (2000: 
esp. p. 467 ff.). 
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important in the present context:59 
 
na ca parini∑†hitavastusvarËpatve 'pi pratyak∑ådivi∑ayatvaµ brahmaˆa˙, “tat tvam asi” iti 
brahmåtmabhåvasya ßåstram antareˆånavagamyamånatvåt/ .../ yady apy anyatra 
vedavåkyånåµ vidhisaµsparßam antareˆa pramåˆatvaµ na d®∑†aµ, tathåpy 
åtmavijñånasya phalaparyantatvån na tadvi∑ayasya ßåstrasya pråmåˆyaµ ßakyaµ 
pratyåkhyåtum/  
And Brahma, even though by its nature an existing thing, is not the object of perception 
etc., because the identity of Brahma and the self known from ‘That's who you are’ 
(ChånUp 6.8.7) [can] not be known without the Veda. ... Although elsewhere Vedic 
sentences are not seen to be authoritative without being connected with injunctions, the 
authority of Vedic texts that concern [knowledge of the self] cannot be rejected, because 
knowledge of the self leads to a result. 
 
Put differently, traditional M¥måµså is completely correct but for the fact that its very principles 
should oblige it to include among the statements that will have to be taken literally, beside 
injunctions, also Upani∑adic sentences pertaining to Brahma. Ía∫kara, far from being a critic of 
M¥måµså, presents himself here as an even more conscientious applier of M¥måµså principles 
than the traditional M¥måµsakas themselves. 
 Elsewhere in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya Ía∫kara emphasises again that Brahma cannot be 
known by any other means than only the Veda:60 
 
yat tËktaµ parini∑pannatvåd brahmaˆi pramåˆåntaråˆi saµbhaveyur iti tad api 
manorathamåtram/ rËpådyabhåvåd dhi nåyam artha˙ pratyak∑asya gocara˙/ 
li∫gådyabhåvåc ca nånumånåd¥nåm/ ågamamåtrasamadhigamya eva tv ayam artho 
dharmavat/ 
As to what has been claimed, namely that other means of knowledge may be possible with 
respect to Brahma because the latter is a completed thing, [the answer is:] That, too, is 
wishful thinking. For this object (viz., Brahma), not possessing colour etc., [can] not be 
the object of perception; nor of inference and so on, because there is no inferential mark. 
This object can rather only be known through the Veda (ågama), just like Dharma (which 
can only be known through Vedic injunctions). 
 
Ía∫kara's acceptance of M¥måµså principles does not mean that he always reaches the same 
                                                
59 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.4 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 63 l. 4 - p. 65 l. 2). See further Rambachan, 1997. 
60 BSËBhå on sËtra 2.1.6 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 360 l. 6-8). 
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conclusions as the ritual M¥måµsakas. Statements about Brahma have to be accepted for reasons 
which the traditional M¥måµsaka should find convincing. But Ía∫kara goes further. Information 
contained in arthavådas (i.e., statements like “He wept”, cited by Ía∫kara's M¥måµså opponent) 
and in mantras, if it is not in conflict with other sources of knowledge, will have to be accepted, 
too. In this way we learn that the gods have bodies etc., a position that had been rejected by 
Íabara. Ía∫kara explains this in his commentary on BrahmasËtra 1.3.33:61 
 
yad apy uktaµ mantrårthavådayor anyårthatvån na devatåvigrahådiprakåßanasåmarthyam 
iti/ atra brËma˙: pratyayåpratyayau hi sadbhåvåsadbhåvayo˙ kåraˆaµ, nånyårthatvam 
ananyårthatvaµ vå/ tathå hy anyårtham api prasthita˙ pathi patitaµ t®ˆaparˆådy ast¥ty eva 
pratipadyate/ atråha: vi∑ama upanyåsa˙/ tatra hi t®ˆaparˆådivi∑ayaµ pratyak∑aµ prav®ttam 
asti yena tadastitvaµ pratipadyate/ atra punar vidhyuddeßaikavåkyabhåvena stutyarthe 
'rthavåde na pårthagarthyena v®ttåntavi∑ayå prav®tti˙ ßakyådhyavasåtum/ na hi mahåvåkye 
'rthapratyåyake 'våntaravåkyasya p®thak pratyåyakatvam asti/ yathå ‘na suråµ pibet’ iti 
nañvati våkye padatrayasaµbandhåt suråpånaprati∑edha evaiko 'rtho 'vagamyate/ na 
puna˙ suråµ pibed iti padadvayasaµbandhåt suråpånavidhir ap¥ti/ atrocyate: vi∑ama 
upanyåsa˙/ yuktaµ yat suråpånaprati∑edhe padånvayasyaikatvåd 
avåntaravåkyårthasyågrahaˆam/ vidhyuddeßårthavådayos tv arthavådasthåni padåni 
p®thag anvayaµ v®ttåntavi∑ayaµ pratipadyånantaraµ kaimarthyavaßena kåmaµ vidhe˙ 
ståvakatvaµ pratipadyante/ .../ tad yatra so 'våntaravåkyårtha˙ pramåˆåntaragocaro 
bhavati tatra tadanuvådenårthavåda˙ pravartate/ yatra pramåˆåntaraviruddhas tatra 
guˆavådena/ yatra tu tad ubhayaµ nåsti tatra kiµ pramåˆåntaråbhåvåd guˆavåda˙ syåd 
åhosvit pramåˆåntaråvirodhåd vidyamånavåda iti prat¥tißaraˆair vidyamånavåda 
åßrayaˆ¥ya˙ na guˆavåda˙/ etena mantro vyåkhyåta˙/ 
With regard to what has been said — viz., that neither a mantra nor an arthavåda is 
capable of revealing the body and other [features] of divinities, this because [mantra and 
arthavåda] have another purpose — we answer: Cognition and absence of cognition, not 
the fact of having or not having another purpose, are the cause for [accepting] the 
existence and non-existence [respectively of something]. For example, a man, though 
traveling for another purpose, knows that the grass, leaves and other things that have 
fallen on his path are there. 
At this point [the opponent] objects: The comparison is not appropriate. For in that 
[comparison] perception with grass, leaves and other things as objects has taken place, 
with the help of which [the traveler] knows that these [objects] are there. In the present 
case, on the other hand, since the arthavåda has praise [of some sacrificial injunction] as 
                                                
61 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.3.33 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 269 l. 12 - p. 272 l. 2). 
Vedånta as M¥måµså  30 
 
 
  
purpose by being united into one sentence with that injunction, it is not possible to 
determine that it has, by having a different purpose [as well], an event as object. For a 
sentence that is included in a larger sentence that expresses a meaning, does not separately 
express [another meaning]. For example, in the negative sentence “One should not drink 
alcoholic beverages” (na suråµ pibet), because of the connection between the three 
constituent words, only one meaning, viz. the prohibition of drinking alcoholic beverages, 
is understood; but not also the injunction to drink alcoholic beverages on account of the 
connection between the two words suråµ pibet “One should drink alcoholic beverages”. 
Here the following reply is given: The comparison is not appropriate. It is correct that in 
the prohibition of alcoholic beverages the meaning of the included sentence (suråµ pibet) 
is not understood because there is only one syntactical connection between the words. 
However, in the case of an injunction and its accompanying arthavåda, the words of the 
arthavåda, having [first and] separately reached syntactic agreement with an event as 
object, they subsequently, under the influence of the question ‘what for?’, do indeed 
praise the injunction. ... Therefore, where the meaning of an included sentence belongs to 
the realm of another means of valid cognition (and is corroborated by it), there the 
arthavåda plays its role in accordance with that [other means of valid cognition]. Where 
[the meaning of the included sentence] is contradicted by another means of valid 
cognition, [there the arthavåda plays its role] through secondary communication. But 
where neither of the two is the case, there those who rely upon cognition must accept that 
[the arthavåda] communicates something existing, on the basis of the following reflection: 
“Should it be secondary communication on account of the fact that there is no other 
means of valid cognition (with regard to its contents), or a communication of something 
existing because it is not in contradiction with another means of valid cognition?”. In this 
same way the mantra has been explained. 
 
It is striking that here, once again, Ía∫kara turns the methods of M¥måµså against itself. He does 
not deny that arthavådas are to be understood with injunctions. He merely adds, on the basis of a 
semantic analysis, that this does not do away with their literal contents, which have to be 
accepted if no other means of valid cognition militates against this. 
 Ía∫kara applies essentially the same method to distinguish between statements about 
Brahma that are literally true and such that are not. He clearly distinguishes between these two in 
his commentary on BrahmasËtra 4.3.14:62 
 
                                                
62 BSËBhå on sËtra 4.3.14 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 884 l. 5 - p. 885 l. 5). Tr. Gambhirananda, 1972: 885-86, modified; cp. 
Comans, 2000: 223. 
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jagadutpattisthitipralayahetutvaßruter anekaßaktitvaµ brahmaˆa iti cet/ na/ 
viße∑aniråkaraˆaßrut¥nåm ananyårthatvåt/ utpattyådißrut¥nåm api samånam 
ananyårthatvam63 iti cet/ na/ tåsåm ekatvapratipådanaparatvåt/ m®dådid®∑†åntair hi sato 
brahmaˆa ekasya satyatvaµ vikårasya cån®tatvaµ pratipådayac chåstraµ 
notpattyådiparaµ bhavitum arhati/ kasmåt punar utpattyådißrut¥nåµ 
viße∑aniråkaraˆaßrutiße∑atvaµ na punar itaraße∑atvam itaråsåm iti/ ucyata: 
viße∑aniråkaraˆaßrut¥nåµ niråkå∫k∑årthatvåt/ na hy åtmana 
ekatvanityatvaßuddhatvådyavagatau satyåµ bhËya˙ kåcid åkå∫k∑opajåyate 
puru∑årthasamåptibuddhyupapatte˙ .../ ... na viße∑aniråkaraˆaßrut¥nåm anyaße∑atvam 
avagantuµ ßakyate/ naivam utpattyådißrut¥nåµ niråkå∫k∑årthapratipådanasåmarthyam 
asti/ pratyak∑aµ tu tåsåm anyårthatvaµ samanugamyate/ ... evam utpattyådißrut¥nåm 
aikåtmyåvagamaparatvån nånekaßaktiyogo brahmaˆa˙/ 
Opponent: Brahma can have different powers since the Upani∑ads show It to be the cause 
of the origin, continuance, and dissolution of the universe. 
Vedåntin: Not so, since the Upani∑adic texts denying distinctive attributes cannot be 
interpreted in any other way. 
Opponent: In the same way the texts about origin etc. cannot be interpreted otherwise. 
Vedåntin: Not so, for their purpose is to establish unity. The text that propounds the 
reality of Brahma, existing alone without a second, and that proves the unreality of all 
modifications with the help of illustrations like clay, cannot be meant for establishing the 
truth of origin etc. 
Opponent: Why again should the texts about origin etc. be subservient to the texts 
denying distinction and not the other way round? 
Vedåntin: The answer is that this is so because the texts denying distinction lead to a 
knowledge which is complete by itself (and leaves behind no more curiosity to be 
satisfied). For when one has realized that the Self is one, eternal, pure, and so on, one 
cannot have any more curiosity to be satisfied as a result of the rise in him of the 
conviction that the highest human goal has been reached ... [T]he texts denying 
distinctions cannot be understood to be subservient to others. But the texts about origin 
etc. cannot give rise to any such self-contained knowledge (that allays further curiosity). 
As a matter of fact, they are seen to aim at something else. ... Thus since the texts about 
creation etc. are meant for imparting the knowledge of oneness, Brahma cannot be 
possessed of many powers. 
 
 [There is one important domain in which Ía∫kara does not always follow the example of 
                                                
63 J. L. Shastri's edition has incorrect anyårthatvam. 
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classical M¥måµså as we find it in Íabara's Bhå∑ya. The latter's exegetical efforts follow the 
fundamental principle that an interpretation that is “nearer”, i.e. presents itself more directly, is to 
be preferred to one that is more “remote”.64 Ía∫kara, following the BrahmasËtra, sometimes 
deviates from this principle. Under BrahmasËtra 1.1.22 he admits that in connection with the 
word åkåßa the meaning bhËtåkåßa ‘the element ether’ presents itself immediately to the mind 
(ß¥ghraµ buddhim årohati); yet he rejects this sense in favour of another one: Brahma. The 
principle of “proximity” as a yard-stick for comparing interpretations is yet behind the important 
M¥måµsåsËtra (3.3.14), known to Ía∫kara,65 which enumerates a number of criteria of 
interpretation in order of decreasing importance (and justifies this with the word arthaviprakar∑åt 
“because the meaning obtained with their help is more remote”).66] 
 If then Ía∫kara makes an effort to present the Vedåntic way to liberation as a form of 
M¥måµså, does this have any effect on the precise nature of this path? Here it is to be 
remembered that M¥måµså — i.e., first of all ritual M¥måµså — takes as point of departure the 
hypothetical situation of a man with an open mind and without prior expectations who is being 
confronted with the contents of the Veda, presumably during the process of learning it by heart. 
Coming across an injunction this man will know that he must execute this or that activity, he will 
interpret other Vedic sentences along with injunctions, etc. etc. The whole of M¥måµså in its 
sometimes confusing complexity is presented as resulting naturally from this confrontation, in 
which the learner must however preserve his unbiased openness to the text. In the end this learner 
will carry out rituals and do all the other things that are required, not (according to the theory) 
because someone told or taught him to do so, but simply because this is the natural reaction to a 
confrontation with the texts he has learnt. 
 This same hypothetical situation applies to Brahma-M¥måµså. Imagine the same man as 
before now learning the Upani∑ads by heart. He will come across, and by hypothesis understand, 
sentences that teach him e.g. that his self is identical with Brahma. Ía∫kara makes a point of 
arguing that these sentences are no injunctions, so that there is no prescription to meditate on 
Brahma or the like. That is to say, these sentences do nothing beyond passing some information. 
But important information it is! It is the kind of information that informs a person that the snake 
which had given him a fright is really a rope. Such information does not prescribe anything, yet 
totally changes the situation of those who receive it. Our Vedic student will all of a sudden know 
that his self is Brahma and therefore be liberated. By hypothesis he does not have to do anything 
to attain this state; indeed, there is nothing he can do. Liberation in this way is the result of an 
unbiased confrontation with the relevant parts of the Veda, and of nothing else. 
                                                
64 See Bronkhorst, 1997. 
65 Renou, 1957: 125 / 473 / 411 sq. 
66 M¥mSË 3.3.14: ßruti-li∫ga-våkya-prakaraˆa-sthåna-samåkhyånåµ samavåye pradaulbalyam arthaviprakar∑åt. 
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 It is important to realise that Ía∫kara's determination to present Vedånta as M¥måµså 
inevitably leads him to the position that liberation is the result of the mere confrontation with the 
relevant Upani∑adic statements.67 He does indeed emphasise in various places that only 
knowledge is required to attain that goal, which may be attained either from the mere hearing of 
Upani∑adic sentences or from contemplation on them. However, John A. Taber (1983: 13 ff.) has 
plausibly argued, citing a variety of passages, that Ía∫kara's position must have been somewhat 
more complex. On several occasions Ía∫kara states quite clearly that works can purify a person 
so that he can then know the self. A clear example is Ía∫kara's Bhå∑ya on B®hadåraˆyaka 
Upani∑ad 4.4.22:68 
 
kathaµ punar nityasvådhyåyådibhi˙ karmabhir åtmånaµ vividi∑anti? naiva hi tåny 
åtmånaµ prakåßayanti yathopani∑ada˙/ nai∑a do∑a˙/ karmaˆåµ vißuddhihetutvåt/ 
karmabhi˙ saµsk®tå hi vißuddhåtmåna˙ ßaknuvanty åtmånam upani∑atprakåßitam 
apratibandhena veditum/ 
But how do [Brahmins] desire to know the self by means of works such as the obligatory 
recitation of the Veda? For those [works] do not illuminate the self, as do the Upani∑ads. 
Nothing wrong here, because [these] works are the cause of purification. For those who 
have been purified by works, whose selves are pure, are able to know the self revealed by 
the Upani∑ads without obstruction. 
 
The Bhå∑ya on Taittir¥ya Upani∑ad 1.11 is equally clear:69 
 
virodhåd eva ca vidyå mok∑aµ prati na karmåˆy apek∑ate/ svåtmalåbhe tu 
pËrvopacitaduritapratibandhåpanayadvåreˆa vidyåhetutvaµ pratipadyante karmåˆi 
nityån¥ti/ .../ evaµ cåvirodha˙ karmavidhißrut¥nåm/ ata˙ kevalåyå eva vidyåyå˙ paraµ 
ßreya iti siddham/ 
It is precisely because of this conflict [between karma and knowledge] that knowledge 
does not depend on karma as far as mok∑a is concerned. With respect to its own 
attainment, however, we have said that obligatory karma becomes the cause of knowledge 
insofar as it removes previously accumulated hindrances. ... Thus there is no contradiction 
of those scriptural passages that enjoin karma. Hence, that the highest good is a 
consequence of knowledge alone is proved. 
                                                
67 This is not the same as stating that Ía∫kara felt obliged to present it in this way “by the conventions of the literary 
genre he has chosen”, as Taber (1983: 7) maintains. Also other Vedåntins, most notably Ía∫kara's disciple Sureßvara, 
attribute the same importance to the Upani∑adic statements; see Hacker, 1951: 2001 (95) f. 
68 Ía∫kara: B®hadåraˆyakopani∑ad Bhå∑ya p. 300. Cp. Taber, 1983: 17. 
69 Ía∫kara: Taittir¥yopani∑ad Bhå∑ya p. 352-53. Tr. Taber, 1983: 20; cp. Hulin, 2001: 162 ff. 
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Taber concludes (p. 23) that there is “little doubt that Ía∫kara conceives of religious practice as 
an important aid in achieving mok∑a, even if it is not, strictly speaking, its cause”. 
 The beginning of the Upadeßasåhasr¥ (prose) confirms that liberating knowledge will not 
be the share of those who do not fulfil a number of demanding preconditions:70 
 
tad idaµ mok∑asådhanaµ jñånaµ sådhanasådhyåd anityåt sarvasmåd viraktåya 
tyaktaputravittalokai∑aˆåya pratipannaparamahaµsapårivråjyåya 
ßamadamadayådiyuktåya ßåstraprasiddhaßi∑yaguˆasampannåya ßucaye bråhmaˆåya 
vidhivad upasannåya ßi∑yåya jåtikarmav®ttavidyåbhijanai˙ par¥k∑itåya brËyåt puna˙ punar 
yåvad grahaˆaµ d®∂h¥bhavati. 
The [direct] means to liberation, that is, knowledge, should be imparted again and again 
until it is firmly grasped — to a Brahmin disciple who is pure, indifferent to everything 
that is transitory and achievable through worldly means, who has given up the desire for a 
son, for wealth, and for this world and the next, who has adopted the life of a wandering 
monk and is endowed with control over his mind and senses as well as with the other 
qualities of a disciple well known in the scriptures, and who has approached the teacher in 
the prescribed manner and has been examined with respect to his caste, profession, 
conduct, learning, and parentage. 
 
Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya enumerates, under the very first sËtra, the following preconditions 
for an aspiring student: (1) an ability to distinguish between the temporal and the eternal; (2) 
dispassion for the enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions both here and hereafter; (3) attainment 
of the means of tranquillity, self restraint and the like; (4) the desire for liberation.71 
 It should be clear from these and similar passages that not just anyone who is confronted 
with the Upani∑ads will attain liberation. Some will, others won't. The difference lies in the 
degree of preparedness of the students. The preliminary requirements are far from negligible; 
they exclude all those who have not studied the Veda in the prescribed manner (and therefore 
presumably ÍËdras and women), and further reduce the numbers of those who have properly 
carried out their Vedic studies to those who have practised the intellectual and ascetic virtues 
indicated.72 
 
Regarding Ía∫kara's “improved M¥måµså”, Tilmann Vetter (1979: 125) makes the following 
                                                
70 Ía∫kara: Upadeßasåhasr¥, Gadyabandha 1.2 (Mayeda, 1973: 191); tr. Taber, 1983: 24. 
71 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 36 l. 3 - p. 37 l. 1): nityånityavastuviveka˙, ihåmutrårthabhogaviråga˙, 
ßamadamådisådhanasaµpat, mumuk∑utvaµ ca. Cp. Bader, 1990: 59. 
72 See further Sawai, 1986. 
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observation: 
 
[BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya] Einleitung und I 1 1-4 haben ... vor allem die Aufgabe die 
Vedånta-Schule (als Untersuchung des Brahman) deutlich von der M¥måµså-Schule (als 
der Untersuchung des rituellen Werks) abzusetzen. Die prinzipielle Kompromisslosigkeit, 
mit der dies geschieht und eigentlich erst eine von der alten Schule der Veda-
Interpretation unabhängige Schule der Upani∑ad-Interpretation geschaffen wird, mit der 
zumindest alle Versuche zurückgewiesen werden, die immer selbständiger werdende 
Upani∑ad-Interpretation doch noch als eine Abteilung der Karma-M¥måµså zu deuten, 
darf man wohl als eine der bedeutendsten Leistungen Í[a∫kara]s ansehen, bei der er 
wenig von Vorgängern übernommen haben dürfte. 
 
Vetter may well be right in thinking that Ía∫kara may have been the first to think out the 
principles of interpretation to be used for the Upani∑ads. But this is not so much a demarcation 
from traditional M¥måµså, but rather an extension of M¥måµså so as to include Upani∑adic 
interpretation, too. Strictly speaking, and following Ía∫kara's logic, the traditional M¥måµsakas 
had done a good job, but had overlooked the crucial fact that, beside the injunctions, the Veda 
contains other sentences that provide information about things that cannot be contradicted by 
experience or by any other means of knowledge. These other sentences are the famous 
mahåvåkyas of the Upani∑ads. 
 If it is true that Ía∫kara fundamentally approved of traditional M¥måµså and its methods, 
what did he think of the ritual activity which that school of interpretation had found to be the 
main, or even the only, message to be drawn from the Veda? Did he consider this conclusion 
mistaken? By no means. For those who aspire to the aims that can be obtained by sacrificing, 
sacrificing is the appropriate way. For those, however, who aspire for liberation, ritual activity 
plays no role. The question whether rites can play an introductory or purifying role seems to be 
answered differently in different works of Ía∫kara. With regard to the first prose portion of the 
Upadeßasåhasr¥ (Gadyabandha I), Vetter (1979: 139) makes the following observation: “Nirgends 
wird etwas davon gesagt, dass rituelle Werke, die man vor dem Stadium des strengen Entsagens 
tut eine vorbereitende (das Innere reinigende) Funktion haben können.” We read for example in 
Gadyabandha 1.30:73 
 
... prati∑iddhatvåd bhedadarßanasya, bhedavi∑ayatvåc ca karmopådånasya, 
karmasådhanatvåc ca yajñopav¥tåde˙ karmasådhanopådånasya 
                                                
73 Mayeda, 1973: 197; tr. Mayeda, 1979: 85, 220, modified. Mayeda (1979: 85 ff.) gives further citations confirming 
this position. 
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paramåtmåbhedapratipattyå prati∑edha˙ k®to veditavya˙/ karmaˆåµ tatsådhanånåµ ca 
yajñopav¥tåd¥nåµ paramåtmåbhedapratipattiviruddhatvåt/ saµsåriˆo hi karmåˆi 
vidh¥yante tatsådhanåni ca yajñopav¥tåd¥ni, na paramåtmano 'bhedadarßina˙/ 
bhedadarßanamåtreˆa ca tato 'nyatvam/ 
... it is prohibited [by the Írutis] to hold the view that [Ótman] is different [from Brahma]; 
use of the rituals is [made] in the sphere of [the view] that [Ótman] is different [from 
Brahma]; and the sacred thread and the like are requisites for the rituals. Therefore, it 
should be known that the use of rituals and their requisites is prohibited, if the identity [of 
Ótman] with the highest Ótman is realized, since [the use of] rituals and their requisites 
such as the sacred thread is contradictory to the realization of the identity [of Ótman] with 
the highest Ótman. [The use of] rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread is 
indeed enjoined upon a transmigrator [but] not upon one who holds the view of the 
identity [of Ótman] with the highest Ótman; and the difference [of Ótman] from It is 
merely due to the view that [Ótman] is different [from Brahma]. 
 
And Padyabandha 1.15 has:74 
 
viruddhatvåd ata˙ ßakyaµ karma kartuµ na vidyayå/ 
sahaivaµ vidu∑å tasmåt karma heyaµ mumuk∑uˆå// 
Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action], therefore, one who knows so, 
being possessed of this knowledge, cannot perform action. For this reason action should 
be renounced by a seeker after final release. 
 
The Upadeßasåhasr¥ also contains some passages which seem to indicate that ritual activity 
should be carried out, perhaps even until the moment at which cessation of nescience is attained. 
Mayeda (1979: 88 ff.) discusses these passages and suggests that Ía∫kara's drastic denial of 
action was intended to shock his pupils into an insight into the true nature of the Self. 
 
Given that Vedåntic M¥måµså presents itself as the correct interpretation of the Veda, and of its 
final parts in particular, it goes without saying that a precondition for the useful study of the 
BrahmasËtra — or more precisely, for the enquiry into Brahma — should be the study of the 
Veda. Depending on the inclination of the student, the study of ritual M¥måµså — i.e. of the 
enquiry into Dharma — can at that point be skipped, allowing the student to concentrate on the 
insight to be obtained from the Upani∑ads, altogether leaving aside all ritual activity. This is what 
Ía∫kara says in his BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya. In his explanation of BrahmasËtra 1.1.1 (athåto 
                                                
74 Mayeda, 1973: 73; tr. Mayeda, 1979: 87, 104. 
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brahmajijñåså “Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma”) he raises the issue that atha ‘then’ 
indicates that enquiry into Brahma has to follow something else and asks what that could be. The 
answer is found in the following passages:75 
 
sati cånantaryårthatve yathå dharmajijñåså pËrvav®ttaµ vedådhyayanaµ 
niyamenåpek∑ate, evaµ brahmajijñåsåpi yat pËrvav®ttaµ niyamenåpek∑ate tad 
vaktavyam/ svådhyåyånantaryaµ tu samånam/ nanv iha karmåvabodhånantaryaµ viße∑a˙/ 
na, dharmajijñåsåyå˙ pråg apy adh¥tavedåntasya brahmajijñåsopapatte˙/ 
Given that the meaning ‘immediate succession’ is [expressed by the word atha], it should 
be stated what it is that enquiry into Brahma requires as necessarily preceding it, just as 
enquiry into Dharma requires study of the Veda as necessarily preceding it. The fact of 
being preceded by Vedic study is however common [both to the enquiry into Brahma and 
to the enquiry into Dharma]. [Question:] Isn't the difference in this case [of enquiry into 
Brahma] that it is [to be] preceded by understanding ritual activity (i.e., PËrvam¥måµså)? 
[Answer:] No, for enquiry into Brahma is possible for one who has studied the Veda, even 
before enquiry into Dharma. 
 
What further preconditions are there, then, for someone to enter upon “enquiry into Brahma”? 
The answer is to be found in the following sequel to the preceding passage:76 
 
tasmåt kim api vaktavyaµ yadanantaraµ brahmajijñåsopadißyata iti/ ucyate: 
nityånityavastuviveka˙, ihåmutrårthabhogaviråga˙, ßamadamådisådhanasaµpat, 
mumuk∑utvaµ ca/ te∑u hi satsu pråg api dharmajijñåsåyå Ërdhvaµ ca ßakyate jijñåsituµ 
jñåtuµ ca, na viparyaye/ 
Something must therefore be stated after which enquiry into Brahma is taught. 
The answer is: [The requirements for entering upon enquiry into Brahma are] discernment 
between eternal and non-eternal things; renunciation with regard to enjoyment in this and 
the next world; excellence in means such as peace, restraint, etc.; and desire to become 
liberated. For when these [elements] are present, one can desire to know, and know, even 
before enquiry into Dharma, as well as after it, not [however] in the opposite case. 
 
These and other passages show that Ía∫kara's ‘improved’ M¥måµså disposes, for all intents and 
purposes, of ritual M¥måµså, leaving place only for Brahma-M¥måµså. Ía∫kara does not say this 
in so many words, but his admission that one does not miss out if one does not study ritual 
                                                
75 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 29 l. 1 - p. 33 l. 1). 
76 BSËBhå on sËtra 1.1.1 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 36 l. 2 - p. 37 l. 2). 
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M¥måµså and does not perform sacrificial rites says it all. Ía∫kara's is a “palace revolution” 
inside M¥måµså, leaving an altogether different ideology in charge. 
  
If the preceding pages have shown that Ía∫kara presents himself more often as a M¥måµsaka 
than as a philosopher, some features of his writing that have puzzled earlier commentators 
become understandable. Paul Hacker (1968: 120 [214] ff.) has expressed surprise about the fact 
that Ía∫kara offers few if any rational arguments in defence of monism, which is yet a central 
part of his philosophy. Hacker looks for a solution in a hypothesis concerning the biography of 
Ía∫kara (first Yogin, then Advaitin). However, Ía∫kara the M¥måµsaka had no need for proofs 
of monism. What is more, knowledge derived from the Veda should be unobtainable by other 
means. This includes knowledge of monism.  
 The realisation that Ía∫kara presents himself as a M¥måµsaka and that for this reason he 
has no need to argue for positions which, he claims, can only be learnt from the Veda, gives rise 
to difficulties in some isolated cases. Hacker already drew attention to the second prose portion of 
the Upadeßasåhasr¥, and Vetter has dedicated a chapter of his book Studien zur Lehre und 
Entwicklung Ía∫karas (1979: 75 ff.) to it. This portion presents an argument for monism, if only 
a short one (Gadyabandha 2.109: ... åtmajyoti∑a˙ ... advaitabhåvaß ca sarvapratyayabhede∑v 
avyabhicåråt “Dass das Licht des Selbst ... zweitlos ist, folgt daraus, dass es in keiner der 
verschiedenen Vorstellungen fehlt” tr. Hacker). This same second prose portion distinguishes 
itself further by the fact that it does not cite a single Upani∑adic passage, and yet ends with the 
statement of the teacher who declares to to his pupil: “Henceforth ... you are liberated from the 
suffering of transmigratory existence” (Gadyabandha 2.109: [a]ta˙ paraµ ... saµsåradu˙khån 
mukto 's¥ti).  
 A passage like this is problematic in the light of what we now know about Ía∫kara as a 
M¥måµsaka. Vetter has cogently argued (1979: 75 f.) that this portion of the Upadeßasåhasr¥ is an 
independent text,77 so that one is entitled to wonder whether it was composed before Ía∫kara had 
come to think as a M¥måµsaka. (This comes close to Vetter own position.)78 Alternatively, one 
may wonder whether this particular portion was really composed by Ía∫kara himself. It is true 
that Mayeda (1965; 1973: 22-64) gives a long list of arguments in order to show that Ía∫kara is 
the author of the Upadeßasåhasr¥. These arguments start however from the assumption that all the 
texts brought together in the Upadeßasåhasr¥ have one and the same author. If we confine our 
attention to the second prose portion (which covers 13 pages in Mayeda's edition and has 
                                                
77 Vetter argues in particular against the reasons adduced by Hacker (1949: 7-9) and Mayeda (1973: 66-67) to 
demonstrate that the three prose portions belong together and form a unity. He shows most notably that the notion 
according to which they respectively deal with hearing (ßravaˆa), thinking (manana) and meditation (nididhyåsana) is 
in conflict with the precise wording of the text. 
78 See also Vetter, 1978a: 52. 
Vedånta as M¥måµså  39 
 
 
  
therefore a decent size) the situation changes drastically. Most of Mayeda's arguments cannot be 
applied to this portion. Where various early author have cited from the Upadeßasåhasr¥ (though 
without using this name), none of them appear to have cited from its prose parts. Of the terms 
which are used in a fashion which is typical for Ía∫kara, only one occurs in the second prose 
portion. In other words, of all the arguments presented by Mayeda, only one applies to the second 
prose portion of the Upadeßasåhasr¥, viz., the fact that here avidyå is used much in the way it is 
used in Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya. There is, finally, a third way to make sense of the 
peculiarities of the second prose portion of the Upadeßasåhasr¥. They may indicate that the line 
between m¥måµsic and non-m¥måµsic Vedånta, even in the case of this important thinker, was 
not always as clearly drawn as we might expect. This does not change the fact that there where 
Ía∫kara speaks as a (Brahma-)M¥måµsaka, Upani∑adic statements are not merely cited to support 
his thought; they are an essential part of it. They are not cited to support views that are also 
supported otherwise. Quite on the contrary, they are the source of knowledge which cannot be 
obtained otherwise. 
 
§3.2.  Other early commentators on the Brahma SËtra 
 
Having discussed in some detail the way in which Ía∫kara presents his thought as an improved 
form of M¥måµså, we can be brief with regard to the other early commentators of the 
BrahmasËtra whose works have survived. Chronologically next to Ía∫kara comes Bhåskara.79 
Like Ía∫kara, Bhåskara establishes under BrahmasËtra 1.1.4 that the proper application of the 
principles of M¥måµså support his claim that Upani∑adic statements can provide knowledge 
about an established thing, viz. Brahma. Bhåskara states here (p. 13 l. 14-16): 
 
vaidikånåm apauru∑eyatvåd anapek∑atvaµ pramåˆåntarånadhigatatvåc ca mËlakåraˆasya 
nåparini∑†hitatvaµ kåryatvaµ vå pråmåˆye kåraˆaµ kiµ tv anadhigatårthagant®tvam 
Since Vedic [statements] are without author, they do not depend upon [other means of 
knowledge]. Since moreover the root cause [of the world] (i.e., Brahma) is not known 
through any other means of knowledge, it is not its not being established or its having to 
be carried out that is the cause of the authoritativeness [of the relevant Vedic statements]. 
On the contrary, it is the fact that [those Vedic statements] make known an object that is 
[otherwise] unknown [which is the cause for those statements being authoritative]. 
 
Bhåskara's formulation is a bit complex, but his intentions are clear. The ritual M¥måµsakas may 
maintain that only things that are not established and that have to be carried out, i.e., activities, 
                                                
79 Ingalls, 1952; 1954: 293 n. 4; van Buitenen, 1961; Raghavan, 1967; Rüping, 1977: 12 ff. 
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can be made known through the appropriate Vedic statements, i.e., the injunctions, Bhåskara 
formulates the criterion differently. Vedic statements must make known what is not known by 
other means. This includes activities that are to be carried out, to be sure, but not only those. It 
also includes the root cause of the world, for this cannot be known by other means either. 
 Råmånuja introduces his discussion of BrahmasËtra 1.1.4 as follows in his Ír¥bhå∑ya (p. 
306): 
 
yady api pramåˆåntarågocaraµ brahma, tathåpi prav®ttiniv®ttiparatvåbhåvena 
siddharËpaµ brahma na ßåstraµ pratipådayati, ity åßa∫kyåha: ... 
If one has the doubt that, even though Brahma is not covered by any other means of 
knowledge [but the Veda], yet the Veda (ßåstra) does not teach Brahma because, being an 
established thing, it has nothing to do with activity and abstention from activity, the 
answer is given in what follows. 
 
These two short passages should suffice to show that Bhåskara and Råmånuja share with Ía∫kara 
one fundamental tenet: Brahma can only be known through the Veda. That is to say, like Ía∫kara 
they treat Vedånta as a form of M¥måµså. 
 
§3.3.  Maˆ∂ana Mißra 
 
We can compare Ía∫kara's position with that of his possible contemporary80 Maˆ∂ana Mißra. 
Maˆ∂ana is familiar with various views regarding the Upani∑ads, as he points out at the very 
beginning of his Brahmasiddhi (p. 1 l. 7-11): 
 
vedånte∑u vipratipadyante vipaßcita˙: kecid apråmåˆyaµ manyante, åtmana˙ 
pramåˆåntarasiddhatve te∑åm anuvådakatvåt, asiddhatve saµbandhågrahaˆåt apadårthatve 
våkyasyåvi∑ayatvåt, prav®ttiniv®ttyanupadeße cåpuru∑årthatvåt/ anye tu 
pratipattikartavyatåpråmåˆyavyåjenåpråmåˆyam evåhu˙/ anye tu karmavidhivirodhåt 
pratyak∑ådivirodhåc ca ßrutårthaparigrahe upacaritårthån manyante/ 
The learned disagree with respect to the Upani∑ads.  
-Some think that they are not a means of valid cognition, (i) because, if the self is known 
through another means of knowledge, the [Upani∑ads do nothing but] repeat [what is 
already known]; (ii) if [on the other hand, the self] is not [already] known, it cannot be the 
object of a sentence, given that it is not the object of a word because the link [between 
word and object] cannot [in that case] be grasped; (iii) since they do not give instruction 
                                                
80 For a recent discussion, see Thrasher, 1993: 112 ff.; further 1979. 
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into what to do and what not to do, they serve no human purpose. 
-Others state that they are not really a means of valid cognition, using the excuse that they 
are a means providing the cognition that knowledge [of the self] must be accomplished. 
-Others again think that the Upani∑ads express figurative meanings, this because they are 
in conflict with the ritual injunctions and with perception etc. 
 
Maˆ∂ana's own rejection of these positions finds expression in the immediately following 
sentence: tanniråsåyedam årabhyate “To reject these [positions] this [work] is begun.” 
 Like Ía∫kara, Maˆ∂ana, too, maintains in his Brahmasiddhi that Brahma can and must be 
known from the Veda. However, he believes that Brahma can be known through perception as 
well. The chapter called Tarkakåˆ∂a shows elaborately that perception presents non-difference 
(abheda), whereas the distinctions (or particulars) which we believe to perceive are due to mental 
construction (vikalpa): “Perception is first, without mental construction, and has for its object the 
bare thing. The constructive cognitions which follow it plunge into particulars.” (p. 71 l. 1-2: 
vastumåtravi∑ayaµ prathamam avikalpakaµ pratyak∑am; tatpËrvås tu vikalpabuddhayo viße∑ån 
avagåhant[e]; tr. Thrasher, 1993: 80). Maˆ∂ana does not say explicitly that non-difference 
(abheda) or the bare thing (vastumåtra) are identical with Brahma, but Tilmann Vetter (1969: 98 
n. 165) and much more elaborately Allen Wright Thrasher (1993: 77-87) argue convincingly that 
such is the case. In fact, the characteristics of the ‘bare thing’ of the Tarkakåˆ∂a coincide largely 
with the features by which Brahma is described in the Brahmakåˆ∂a. We must therefore assume 
that the following passage in the final chapter (Siddhikåˆ∂a) of the Brahmasiddhi presents 
Maˆ∂ana's own position (p. 157 l. 14-15; cp. Thrasher, 1993: 86): 
 
athavå na loke 'tyantam aprasiddhaµ brahma, sarvapratyayavedyatvåt, brahmaˆo 
vyatirekeˆa pratyetavyasyåbhåvåt, viße∑apratyayånåµ ca såmånyarËpånugamåt ... 
Or rather, Brahma is not totally unknown in ordinary experience, because it is knowable 
in every cognition, because no object of cognition except Brahma exists, and cognitions 
of particulars are always accompanied by the form of the universal, ...81 
 
Maˆ∂ana, then, maintains that Brahma is the object of perception. In the chapter called 
Brahmakåˆ∂a he also suggests that a certain kind of reasoning leads to knowledge of Brahma; 
this reasoning runs as follows (p. 26 l. 16-20):82 
 
                                                
81 Nicholson (2003: 585) speaks of “the intellectually jarring situation of identifying the vastu-måtra ... with the 
universal (såmånya)” into which Maˆ∂ana forces himself. 
82 Cp. Vetter, 1969: 99, and 98 n. 165. 
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viße∑aniv®ttyaiva tat ßabdena buddhau nidh¥yate, suvarˆatattvavat; na hi suvarˆatattvaµ 
piˆ∂arucakådisaµsthånabhedopaplavarahitaµ d®ßyate; na ca ta eva suvarˆatattvam, 
tatparityåge 'pi bhåvåt saµsthånåntare; atha cåd®∑†asaµsthånabhedopaplavavivekam api 
buddhyå bhedåpohadvåreˆa svayaµ prat¥yate, parasmai ca pratipådyate. 
Only by removing distinctions one obtains, with the help of the word, knowledge of it (i.e. 
of Brahma), as of the essence of gold. For the essence of gold, free from distractions in 
the form of specific shapes like that of a clump, neck ornament, etc., is not observed. Nor 
do those [specific shapes] themselves constitute the essence of gold, because [the essence] 
is still there, in the form of another shape, even when those particular shapes are 
abandoned. And yet [the essence of gold] itself, even though its distinction from 
distractions in the form of specific shapes [can] not be seen, is known by means of the 
removal of the specificities with the help of thought, and it can be communicated to 
someone else. 
 
However, because perception is always sullied by ignorance, Maˆ∂ana holds on to the position 
that knowledge of Brahma is based on the Veda alone (p. 157 l. 19-21; cp. Thrasher, 1993 p. 86): 
 
åmnåyaikanibandhanatvaµ tu tasyocyate, pratyak∑åd¥nam avidyåsaµbhinnatvåt; 
pratyastamitanikhilabhedena rËpeˆåvi∑ay¥karaˆåd 
bhedapratyastamayasyåmnåyåvagamyatvåd iti/ 
But this [Brahma as the non-existence of phenomenal diversity] is said to be based on the 
Veda (åmnåya) alone, because perception etc. are associated with avidyå. For, because 
they do not take [Brahma] as their object under the form where all difference has 
disappeared, the disappearance of difference is knowable from the Veda [alone]. 
 
Verse 2 of the Brahmakåˆ∂a (p. 23 l. 18-19) is no doubt to be understood in the same way: 
 
åmnåyata˙ prasiddhiµ ca kavayo 'sya pracak∑ate/ 
bhedaprapañcavilayadvåreˆa ca nirËpaˆåm// 
The wise proclaim knowledge of this (i.e., Brahma) on the basis of the Veda, and its 
determination through the dissolution of the manifoldness of divisions. 
 
Verses 3 and 4 of the Siddhikåˆ∂a (p. 157 l. 10-13) leave perhaps least occasion for ambiguity: 
 
sarvapratyayavedye vå brahmarËpe vyavasthite/ 
prapañcasya pravilaya˙ ßabdena pratipådyate// 
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pravil¥naprapañcena tadrËpeˆa na gocara˙/ 
månåntarasyeti matam åmnåyaikanibandhanam// 
Or rather (vå), though the form of Brahma is established as being known in each 
cognition, the resorption of manifoldness is conveyed by the word [only]. 
Since [Brahma] in that form, in which manifoldness has been resorbed, is not the object of 
any other means of cognition, it is considered to exclusively depend on the Veda. 
 
Thrasher (1993: 81f.) draws attention to the fact that Maˆ∂ana was not the first to hold the view 
that perception gives access to Brahma. Kumårila Bha††a is acquainted with (and criticizes) the 
view that perception has the highest universal as object, and that constructive cognitions add the 
distinctions.83 Kumårila's commentators Umbeka and Pårthasårathi Mißra, moreover, attribute this 
view to Vedåntins. Kumårila's brief remarks do not however permit us to find out whether those 
other Vedåntins yet maintained, like Maˆ∂ana, that knowledge of Brahma is based on the Veda 
only. It is therefore possible that Maˆ∂ana, while continuing an earlier tradition to the extent that 
perception has Brahma as object, gives a m¥måµsic twist to this tradition by emphasizing that 
perception gives imperfect access to Brahma, which must therefore be completed through the 
Veda, so much so that in the end knowledge of Brahma is based on the Veda alone. If this 
understanding of Maˆ∂ana's role in the history of Vedåntic thought is correct, we must conclude 
that this thinker made a determined effort to join the two kinds of Vedånta that existed in his 
time: Vedånta as speculative philosophy and Vedånta as M¥måµså. His Brahmasiddhi shows that 
in the end he opted for Vedånta as M¥måµså, without however doing away with all the ideas that 
more philosophically oriented Vedåntins before him had developed. 
 
 
§4.   Vedånta and liberation as part of Karma-M¥måµså 
 
The preceding sections have shown that we may have to distinguish two forms of Vedåntic 
philosophy, one which is quite independent of the details of Vedic interpretation, and one which 
presents itself as an improved form of M¥måµså, the most sophisticated manner of Vedic 
interpretation. The former is primarily a religico-philosophical movement, which claims 
allegiance, to be sure, to the Upani∑ads, but develops its way to liberation more or less 
independently, without claiming that this way is the outcome of the correct study of the Veda. 
The latter form of Vedåntic philosophy does precisely that, presenting itself as a school of Vedic 
hermeneutics. 
                                                
83 Ílokavårttika, Pratyak∑a, 114-116: mahåsåmånyam anyais tu dravyaµ sad iti cocyate/ såmånyavi∑ayatvaµ ca 
pratyak∑asyaivam åßritam// viße∑ås tu prat¥yante savikalpakabuddhibhi˙/ te ca kecit pratidravyaµ kecid bahu∑u 
saµßritå˙// tån akalpayad utpannaµ vyåv®ttånugatåtmanå/ gavy aßve copajåtaµ tu pratyak∑aµ na vißi∑yate//. 
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 It may not be possible to determine with certainty why and how the link between Vedåntic 
philosophy and M¥måµså has come about. It seems however clear that a certain tension between 
the two must have existed from an early date onward. If and to the extent that the Vedåntists 
wanted ‘their’ Upani∑ads to be included among those part of the Veda that had to be taken 
literally, a confrontation with M¥måµså could hardly be avoided. Those M¥måµsakas, on the 
other hand, who felt attracted to the new ideas about liberation, rebirth etc. that were gaining 
ground all around them, were challenged to find a way to extend their hermeneutical rules so as 
to include the views expressed in the Upani∑ads. We do not know for sure who took the initiative. 
However, there are various indications which suggest that efforts were made within M¥måµså to 
extend its scope. 
 About the attempts to include Vedåntic thought into the Karma-M¥måµså, Vetter says the 
following (1969: 18-19) 
 
Die M¥måµså versuchte zu jener Zeit einen Erlösungsweg in ihr System aufzunehmen 
und dadurch vor allem die konkurrierende vedische Schule des Vedånta zu absorbieren. 
Wie wir aus der Polemik bei Ía∫kara und Maˆ∂ana erfahren, lautete dabei die wichtigste 
Behauptung der M¥måµså, die Erkenntnis des Selbst sei als für die Erlösung 
‘vorgeschrieben’ zu betrachten. Formal lässt sich das durch gewisse Upani∑adsätze 
stützen, z.B. ‘das Selbst soll man schauen’ usw. ([BÓrUp] II, 4, 5). Damit wäre der 
Vedånta keine von der M¥måµså getrennte Disziplin mehr; denn dann wird vom Veda 
zum Ziel der Erlösung ein Mittel bereitgestellt, das man auszuführen hat. 
 
Unfortunately no early texts belonging to these kinds of M¥måµsakas are known to have 
survived. However, as pointed out by Vetter, Ía∫kara and Maˆ∂ana criticise this position. 
Maˆ∂ana does so, for example, at the very beginning of his Brahmasiddhi, in the passage cited in 
§3.3 above. A passage where Ía∫kara does the same occurs in the first chapter of the verse 
section of his Upadeßasåhasr¥:84 
 
nanu karma tathå nityaµ kartavyaµ j¥vane sati/ 
vidyåyå˙ sahakåritvaµ mok∑aµ prati hi tad vrajet// 
yathå vidyå tathå karma coditatvåviße∑ata˙/ 
pratyavåyasm®teß caiva kåryaµ karma mumuk∑ibhi˙// 
nanu dhruvaphalå vidyå nånyat kiµcid apek∑ate/ 
någni∑†omo yathaivånyad dhruvakåryo 'py apek∑ate// 
                                                
84 Upadeßasåhasr¥, Padyabandha 1.8-11; text Mayeda, 1973: 72; tr. Mayeda, 1979: 103-04. For other passages from 
Ía∫kara's works, see Alston, 1989; 1989a. 
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tathå dhruvaphalå vidyå karma nityam apek∑ate/ 
ity evaµ kecid icchanti na karma pratikËlata˙// 
[Objection:] “Should not [certain] action too always be performed while life lasts? For 
this [action], being concomitant with knowledge [of Brahma], leads to final release.85 
“Action, like knowledge [of Brahma, should be adhered to],  s ince [both of 
them] are equally enjoined [by the Írutis]. As the Sm®ti also [lays it down that] 
transgression [results from the neglect of action, so] action should be performed by 
seekers after final release. 
“[If you say that] as knowledge [of Brahma] has permanent fruit, and so does not depend 
upon anything else, [we reply:] Not so! Just as the Agni∑†oma sacrifice, though it has 
permanent fruit, depends upon things other than itself, 
“so, though knowledge [of Brahma] has permanent fruit, it always depends upon action. 
Thus some people think.” [Reply:] Not so, because action is incompatible [with 
knowledge]. 
 
There were other M¥måµsakas, who decided to include the notion of liberation into their own 
system without introducing knowledge of Brahma as a condition. It has already been pointed out 
above that Íabara shows no awareness of the notion of liberation. Attention has also been drawn 
to M¥måµsåsËtra 1.2.1 (åmnåyasya kriyårthatvåd ånarthakyam atadarthånåµ ... “Since the Veda 
is for [ritual] activity, [passages] that are not for that are without purpose ...”), which constitutes 
an argument against the original unity of PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså, and for the absence of the 
notion of liberation — or stronger: for the rejection of that notion — in ritual M¥måµså. 
Attention can furthermore be drawn to M¥måµsåsËtra 4.3.14: sa svarga˙ syåt sarvån praty 
avißi∑†atvåt “The [result of the Vißvajit-sacrifice] must be heaven, because [desire for heaven] is 
present, without distinction, in all [people]”; this sËtra can hardly have been composed by 
someone who “really” aimed for liberation. Prabhåkara — who commented upon the Íåbara 
Bhå∑ya and appears to have lived and worked in the first half of the 7th century C.E. (Yoshimizu, 
1997: 37-49) — still maintains that heaven is the one thing which all humans without exception 
desire to attain (Yoshimizu, 1997: 179-180, with n. 81). However, other ritualists did become 
interested in the notion of liberation. Yoshimizu (1997: 179-180 n. 80) contrasts the position of 
Kumårila in this regard with that of Prabhåkara, probably his contemporary:86 
 
Kumårila hingegen schliesst sich nicht an die traditionnelle Ansicht der M¥måµså-Schule 
                                                
85 I am not sure that this translation does full justice to the original. A more literal translation might be: “For that 
concomitance of knowledge [with action] leads to final release”. 
86 See also Taber's and Yoshimizu's contributions to this volume. 
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an, dass der Himmel das endgültige Ziel des Menschen ist und das Nitya-Opfer das Mittel 
zum Erlangen des Himmels ist. Um die Veranstaltung des Nitya-Opfers in den 
Übungsweg zur Erlösung einzuschliessen, behauptet Kumårila vielmehr in allen seinen 
Werken, dass das Nitya-Opfer in der Tat nur zur Beseitigung der von ihm begangenen 
Sünde beiträgt; vgl. [Ílokavårttika] Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra k. 110: “Wer sich Erlösung 
wünscht, soll sich unter den (im Veda vorgeschriebenen Handlungen) nicht mit dem 
fakultativen Opfer und der verbotenen (Handlung) beschäftigen, soll aber das periodische 
Opfer und das gelegentliche Opfer verrichten, indem er sich die Beseitigung der Sünde 
wünscht” (mok∑årth¥ na pravarteta tatra kåmyani∑iddhayo˙/ nityanaimittike kuryåt 
pratyavåyajihåsayå//); [Tantravårttika] ii, 228, 16-17 ... : “Die je nach der Lebensstufe und 
der Sozialklasse festgelegten periodischen und gelegentlichen Opfer soll man verrichten, 
um [durch die gelegentlichen Opfer] die früher begangene Sünde zu vernichten und 
[durch die periodischen Opfer] der wegen des Versäumnisses zu verursachenden 
künftigen Sünde vorzubeugen” (pratyåßramavarˆaniyatåni nityanaimittikakarmåˆy api 
pËrvak®taduritak∑ayårtham akaraˆanimittånågatapratyavåyaparihårårthaµ ca kartavyåni); 
[Èup†¥kå] v, 246, 4-6: “Es gibt fürwahr keinen Menschen, der bei [der Ausführung] des 
unbedingt zu tuenden (Opfers) kein Ergebnis begehren würde. Wenn [der Gegner meint]: 
‘Wer sich Erlösung wünscht, [begehrt kein Ergebnis]’, stimmt das nicht. Auch der 
(Erlösung begehrende Mensch) kann die Vernichtung der Sünde [als Ergebnis des Opfers] 
begehren, weil die Erlösung unmöglich ist, wenn die (Sünde) vorhanden ist.” (na h¥d®∑a˙ 
puru∑o 'sti yo 'vaßyakartavye phalaµ na kåmayate. mok∑årth¥ cet. tan na, tenåpy avaßyaµ 
påpak∑aya e∑itavya˙. tasmin sati mok∑åbhåvåt). 
 
In the hands of Kumårila, therefore, the performance of Vedic ritual becomes a means to attain 
liberation.87 
 
The Buddhist Bhavya criticises M¥måµså in chapter 9 of his Madhyamakah®daya. Surprisingly, 
he attributes to the M¥måµsakas only one aim, liberation (apavarga, mok∑a), and does not even 
mention heaven. This suggests one of two things: Either Bhavya was not well informed about the 
real concerns of the M¥måµsakas of his time, or he was acquainted with M¥måµsakas who 
maintained that ritual action leads to liberation. The very first verses of the chapter concerned, the 
M¥måµsåtattvanirˆayåvatåra, states Bhavya's understanding of M¥måµså quite explicitly:88 
 
eke 'pavargasanmårgadhyånajñånåpavådina˙/ 
                                                
87 For details see Mesquita, 1994; Bronkhorst, 2007a. 
88 Lindtner, 1999: 253 (text and translation); 2001: 92 (text). 
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kriyåmåtreˆa tatpråptiµ pratipådyånapatrapå˙// 
ßåstroktavr¥hipaßvåjyapatn¥saµbandhakarmaˆa˙/ 
nånyo mårgo 'pavargåya yukta ity åhur ågamåt// 
Without any sense of shame some (i.e., M¥måµsakas) deny that meditation and insight 
[constitute] the true way to deliverance (apavarga). They insist that it can only be 
achieved by rituals. 
They say that according to tradition (ågama) there is no other correct way to deliverance 
(apavarga) than the rituals prescribed in the sacred texts, i.e. [rituals that involve] rice, 
cattle, butter and participation of one's wife. 
 
This might be taken to mean that the idea of liberation came to be grafted upon Vedic sacrifice 
already at the time of Bhavya, at least in the opinion of some M¥måµsakas. Alternatively, we 
may have to accept that Bhavya's information about M¥måµså was incomplete. 
 
It will be useful here to draw attention to the fact that certain Vedåntins, among them Bhåskara 
and Råmånuja, represent the view that a combination of ritual activity and insight into the true 
nature of the self lead to liberation (see below, §5). They were not the first to do so. The 
following passage from the Manusm®ti expresses essentially the same point of view (Manu 12.88-
90): 
 
sukhåbhyudayikaµ caiva nai˙ßreyasikam eva ca/ 
prav®ttaµ ca niv®ttaµ ca dvividhaµ karma vaidikam// 
iha cåmutra vå kåmyaµ prav®ttaµ karma k¥rtyate/ 
ni∑kåmaµ jñånapËrvaµ tu niv®ttam upadißyate// 
prav®ttaµ karma saµsevya devånåm eti såmyatåm/ 
niv®ttaµ sevamånas tu bhËtåny atyeti pañca vai// 
Vedic ritual acts are of two kinds: engaging in activity (prav®tta) and abstaining from 
activity (niv®tta). [The former] leads to the rise of happiness, [the latter] to liberation. 
In this world and in the next, optional ritual acts are known as ‘engaging in activity’, 
whereas obligatory ritual acts accompanied by knowledge are taught to be ‘abstaining 
from activity’. 
Having been dedicated to ritual acts that are ‘engaging in activity’ one becomes equal to 
the gods; being dedicated to [ritual acts that are] ‘abstaining from activity’, on the other 
hand, one passes beyond the five elements.89 
                                                
89 Two verses later, interestingly, the Manusm®ti states the opposite, viz., that a Brahmin should abandon ritual 
activity: “A priest should give up even the activities described above and devote himself diligently to the knowledge 
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These few passages illustrate well enough that inside the ritual tradition forces were at work to 
incorporate the notion of liberation, either by including knowledge of Brahma among the things 
enjoined in the Veda, or by adding it as a precondition for carrying out ritual, or finally by simply 
claiming that the correct execution of the ritual by itself was an essential step on the way to 
liberation. 
 
 
§5.   PËrva-M¥måµsåsËtra,  Uttara-M¥måµsåsËtra and the teacher quotations 
 
Asko Parpola, in some articles that have already been referred to above, makes the suggestion 
that the terms PËrvam¥måµså and Uttaram¥måµså “seem to have come to being as a result of an 
erroneous analysis as PM-S and UM-S respectively of the names PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra 
(abbreviated PMS) and Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra (UMS).” (Parpola, 1981: 147-148). He continues: “I 
suspect that originally the terms PM and UM did not occur at all outside the book titles or rather 
headings PMS and UMS, but have evolved from these, and that the correct analysis of the latter is 
P-MS and U-MS. In other words, I suggest that the references of the words pËrva and uttara is not 
the two branches of M¥måµså as a philosophical system, but the two portions of one 
single work called M¥måµsåsËtra. PMS would thus have originally meant ‘the former or 
first part of the M¥måµsåsËtra’, and UMS correspondingly ‘the latter or second part of the 
M¥måµsåsËtra’, not ‘the SËtra of PËrva-M¥måµså/Uttara-M¥måµså’.”90 
 Parpola provides a number of arguments in defence of his thesis, some of which have 
already been dealt with above. He does not however address the question to what extent the 
textual evidence supports the priority of the expressions PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra and 
Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra to PËrvam¥måµså and Uttaram¥måµså respectively. And yet, this is an issue 
that cannot be ignored. 
 The M¥måµsåko∑a has no entries for (or beginning with) PËrvam¥måµså and 
Uttaram¥måµså. This raises the question whether the two terms can be found in surviving 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the self, to tranquillity, and to the recitation of the Veda” (Manu 12.92: yathoktåny api karmåˆi parihåya 
dvijottama˙/ åtmajñåne ßame ca syåd vedåbhyåse ca yatnavån//; tr. Doniger and Smith, 1991: 287). The translators 
point out in a footnote: “A similar passage in favour of renunciation, even in preference to the Vedic ritual that is 
otherwise Manu's first concern, appears at 6.86 and 6.96.” It may here be recalled that contradictions like this one are 
frequent in the Manusm®ti, which can hardly have been composed by one single author. 
90 Parpola's (1994: 293 n. 2) statement to the effect that “This hypothesis is endorsed by Clooney 1990: 25ff.” seems 
premature. Clooney says (1990: 27): “But without proposing that [Parpola's] efforts to relate the two M¥måµsås are 
entirely premature, I suggest that we must study in depth and detail the twelve Adhyåyas of Jaimini and four 
Adhyåyas of Bådaråyaˆa in order to understand what is actually being said and in what manner in the PËrva and 
Uttara M¥måµsås. Working ‘from within’ will shed a great deal of light on the question of the unity of the two 
systems and do so in a more fruitful fashion than by considering the ‘M¥m¥µså’ titles (which in any case did not 
belong to the texts in the very beginning).” 
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PËrvam¥måµså works. No such occurrences are known to me.91 
 The colophons to Ía∫kara's commentary on the BrahmasËtra call his commentary 
Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhå∑ya. This text never uses the terms Uttaram¥måµså or Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra 
according to the Word Index brought out under the general editorship of T.M.P. Mahadevan 
(1971, 1973).92 They do not occur in Ía∫kara's Upadeßasåhasr¥, according to the Index of Words 
in Mayeda's (1973) edition, nor in his G¥tåbhå∑ya, according to D'Sa's Word-Index (1985). I have 
not found these terms in Padmapåda's Pañcapådikå. Sureßvara, too, in the passage considered 
above, speaks of the Íår¥raka which, in view of the context, must stand for Íår¥raka SËtra. 
Bhåskara, a commentator on the BrahmasËtra who must be slightly younger than Ía∫kara, does 
not appear to use the terms PËrvam¥måµså and Uttaram¥måµså. The fact that he uses the term 
M¥måµså to refer to ritual M¥måµså (e.g. p. 6 l. 12-13: na ca brahmavi∑ayo vicåro m¥måµsåyåµ 
kvacid adhikaraˆe vartate ...; p. 15 l. 20-21: na ca niyogasya våkyårthatve m¥måµsåyåµ 
bhå∑yåk∑araµ ßår¥rake vå sËtråk∑araµ sËcakam asti93) would seem to confirm this, in spite of the 
fact that his commentary calls itself in the colophons Íår¥rakam¥måµså Bhå∑ya. 
 An early attestation of PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså occurs in Yåmuna's Ótmasiddhi,94 
where it is stated (p. 25 l. 12-13):95 prapañcitaß ca pËrvottaram¥måµsåbhågayor 
nirålambanatvaprati∑edha˙; yathårthakhyåtisamarthanena ca ßåstra iti na vyåvarˆyate. Mesquita 
(1988: 62 n. 77) translates: “Und die Widerlegung der [von den Buddhisten gelehrten] 
Objektlosigkeit [der Erkenntnis] wurde [in den Werken] der beiden Teile[, nämlich der] PËrva- 
und der Uttaram¥måµså, ausführlich vorgetragen, und [zuletzt auch] in [Nåthamunis] Lehrbuch 
[Nyåyatattva] zusammen mit der Rechtfertigung der [Irrtumslehre] Yathårthakhyåti. Deshalb 
wird [sie hier] nicht dargelegt.” Råmånuja's Ír¥bhå∑ya speaks of PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså in a 
passage which points out the difference between the two (p. 4 l. 9-10: ... pËrvottaram¥måµsayo˙ 
bheda˙). The Prapañcah®daya, as we have seen, speaks of the PËrvam¥måµsåßåstra which it 
considers to reflect upon the Dharma connected with the PËrvakåˆ∂a, and of the 
Uttaram¥måµsåßåstra which reflects upon Brahma of the Uttarakåˆ∂a.96 
                                                
91 They do not, for example, occur in Megumu Honda's “Index to the Ílokavårttika” (1993). 
92 Cp. e.g. Padmapåda's Pañcapådikå (ed. S. Subrahmanyaßåstri) p. 69, 298, 300, 511: vedåntam¥måµså; p. 510: 
vedåntavåkyam¥måµså. 
93 Bhåskara's subsequent remarks cite a sentence from the Bhå∑ya (ye pråhu˙ kim api bhåvayed iti te 
svargakåmapadasambandhåt svargaµ bhåvayed iti brËyu˙) which is Íabara on M¥mSË 2.1.1, p. 340; and a sËtra 
(k®taprayatnåpek∑as tu ...) which is BrahmasËtra 2.3.42. 
94 The Ótmasiddhi is traditionally considered part of Yåmuna's Siddhitraya, but was originally an independent work; 
see Mesquita, 1973: 184. 
95 Cited Mesquita, 1988: 62. 
96 This might be taken as an indication that the Prapañcah®daya is a relatively recent text, dating roughly from the 
time of Yåmuna and Råmånuja. See note 26, above. 
 Among more recent texts that mention PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså Såyaˆa's commentary on the Ùgveda 
(e.g. vol. I p. 10 l. 4 and 6) may be mentioned. See further Ír¥nivåsa's Yatipatimatad¥pikå (= Yat¥ndramatad¥pikå) p. 
12: sa ca veda˙ karmabrahmapratipådakapËrvottarabhågåbhyåµ dvidhå bhinna˙/ årådhanakarmapratipådakaµ 
pËrvakåˆ∂am/ årådhyapratipådakam uttarakåˆ∂am/ ubhayor m¥måµsayor aikaßåstryam/. 
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 It will be clear that, as long as no earlier occurrences of the expressions PËrva- and Uttara-
m¥måµså will have been identified, Parpola's proposal as to the original use of these expressions 
will not be based on any direct evidence. 
 However, a more plausible interpretation of these terms is possible. Consider first the four 
hypotheses presented and rejected as pËrvapak∑as by Parpola (1981: 145-146): 
1) “the PËrva-m¥måµså has come into being as a philosophical system earlier than the Uttara-
m¥måµså”; 
2) “PËrva-m¥måµså is so called because it deals with that part of the Vedic literature which was 
composed earlier, ... while the Uttara-måmåµså is concerned with the later part of the Íruti”; 
3) “PËrva- and Uttara-m¥måµså [are] ‘the discussion of the first and second (part of the Veda)’ 
respectively”; 
4) “PËrva-m¥måµså [is] ‘the preliminary investigation’, ... establishing beyond doubt the 
authority and reliability of the Veda and elaborating methods of interpreting it. It thus provides 
the requirements needed for the Uttara-m¥måµså or ‘the final investigation’”. 
 Parpola is probably right in rejecting all these four hypotheses, but his reason for doing so, 
viz. that all these interpretations erroneously take the existence of the terms PËrvam¥måµså and 
Uttaram¥måµså for granted, does not appear to be valid, as we have seen. The fourth hypothesis 
may however be closest to the truth. This can be seen as follows. 
 For Ía∫kara, as we have seen, Vedåntic thought (which he calls Íår¥raka- or Brahma-
M¥måµså) can be studied instead of ritual M¥måµså (which he does not call PËrva-M¥måµså). 
The two are not therefore ordered in time for him. The situation is however altogether different 
for other commentators of the BrahmasËtra. Bhåskara states that reflection on Dharma has to 
precede reflection on Brahma (p. 2 l. 25-26: pËrvaµ tu dharmajijñåså kartavyå; p. 3 l. 25-26: 
tasmåt pËrvav®ttåd dharmajñånåd anantaraµ brahmajijñåseti yuktam). Reflection on Dharma is 
the business of ritual M¥måµså, whose first sËtra begins with the words: athåto dharmajijñåså. 
Råmånuja states the same in different words (Ír¥bhå∑ya p. 4 l. 3-4: pËrvav®ttåt karmajñånåd 
anantaraµ ... brahma jñåtavyam).97 That is to say, for these thinkers PËrva-M¥måµså has to 
precede Uttara-M¥måµså in the life of a man (even if Bhåskara does not appear to use these 
precise terms). The fact that we find these terms first in the writings of Råmånuja and his 
predecessor Yåmuna suggests that the terms have to be interpreted quite simply as earlier and 
later M¥måµså in the sense that the study of these two “sciences” were meant to occupy the 
attention of the thinkers concerned ‘earlier’ respectively ‘later’ in their lives.98 It appears that only 
                                                
97 See further Sawai, 1993. 
98 Renou (1942: 117 [442, 323]) is no doubt right in thinking that “[la prévalence de l'ultériorité] est constante au 
fond de la notion d'uttara-m¥måµså appliquée au Vedånta en tant que spéculation postérieure et supérieure à la fois à 
la M¥måµså première”, but the claimed link with the grammatical sËtra viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam (P. 1.4.2) is far 
from evident. 
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later these terms came to be used by Advaitins, as in the passage from the Prapañcah®daya cited 
in §1 above. 
 
We have already seen that the new argument which Parpola adduces to show that originally the 
PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra and the BrahmasËtra99 were part of one single text is the fact that both quote 
the same teachers; teacher quotations figure, as a matter of fact, in the subtitle of his articles.100 
After our preceding considerations, it will be clear that this argument, if it is one, is the only one 
remaining. Let us therefore look at these quotations more closely. 
 Parpola (1981: 155-57) provides an “exhaustive tabulation” which shows “that both texts 
cite what is in practice an identical selection of named authorities”. The exceptions, Parpola 
continues, concern a few rarely occurring names only. It can easily be seen from this tabulation 
that the BrahmasËtra never cites the name of a teacher that is not also cited in the 
PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra (along with the Sa∫kar∑akåˆ∂a). There is only one exception: the name of 
Kåßak®tsna, which only occurs in the BrahmasËtra (1.4.22), but not in the ritual M¥måµsåsËtra. 
 It must be admitted that this state of affairs is quite extraordinary. It becomes even more 
extraordinary if we take into consideration Renou's (1962: 197 [623]) observation to the extent 
that these cited teachers never express a dissident view in the BrahmasËtra. If taken at its face 
value, all this implies that the authorities responsable for the development of “Vedåntic” thought 
were the same as those who developed ritual thought. Parpola (1981: 158) concludes from this 
that “it is quite clear that both Jaimini and Bådaråyaˆa, as well as the other authorities quoted, 
were well acquainted with both branches of the M¥måµså, just like the earliest commentators of 
the unified M¥måµsåsËtra”. This conclusion seems reasonable enough, but raises the question 
which we formulated at the beginning of this article, but this time in a more extreme form: Must 
we really believe that all those early ritualists — this time not only Jaimini and his early 
commentators, but also the authorities he quotes — were in their heart of hearts Vedåntins? 
Moreover, how is it possible that only recognised ritual teachers contributed to Vedåntic thought? 
 What do we know about the early development of Vedåntic thought? Parpola paints the 
following picture. Having pointed out that there was a “twofold m¥måµså” connected with Vedic 
ritual from the very beginning (1981: 158 ff.), he states with regard to its late-Vedic history (p. 
162): “I have no doubt that this twofold m¥måµså continued to be practised by the Vedic 
ritualists even after the Upani∑adic period right down to the days of the M¥måµsåsËtra, although 
the ceremonial and speculative (or practical and theoretical) sides of this early scholarly activity 
                                                
99 We have already seen (§1) that Parpola, following others, prefers to speak “of a treatise upon the Vedånta, which 
the [present BrahmasËtra] would have replaced, not without thereby utilizing some of its elements”. About the 
difference in style between M¥måµsåsËtra and BrahmasËtra, see Renou, 1962; on the references in the BrahmasËtra 
to relatively late developments in Indian philosophy, see Jacobi, 1911: 13 [571] f. 
100 Cp. further Parpola, 1981: 165: “The teacher quotations of the PMS and the UMS are important as a proof of the 
original unity of these two texts ...” 
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were henceforth recorded separately, in the KalpasËtras and in the (later) Upani∑ads.” This 
picture gives rise to several questions. 
 First of all, whatever may have been the case in early days, at the time of and following 
the Vedic Upani∑ads Vedåntic thought is not just the theoretical side of ritual activity. This is 
particularly clear from passages in the Upani∑ads that express themselves critically with regard to 
the Vedic ritual tradition.101 There is also the tendency, which manifests itself in late-Vedic texts, 
to ‘interiorize’ ritual practice, to ‘deritualize’ it.102 Then there are passages which distinguish 
those who reach the world of Brahma by reason of a special insight from those who sacrifice and 
are as a result reborn in this world.103 Criticism of Vedic ritualism perhaps finds its culmination in 
the late-Vedic Muˆ∂aka Upani∑ad (still commented upon by Ía∫kara); the following passage 
illustrates this:104 
 
avidyåyåµ bahudhå vartamånå, vayaµ k®tårthå ity abhimanyanti bålå˙/ 
yat karmiˆo na pravedayanti rågåt, tenåturå˙ k∑¥ˆalokåß cyavante// 
i∑†åpËrtaµ manyamånå vari∑†aµ nånyac chreyo vedayante pramË∂hå˙/ 
nåkasya p®∑†he te suk®te 'nubhËtvemaµ lokaµ h¥nataraµ vå vißanti// 
tapa˙ßraddhe ye hy upavasanty araˆye, ßåntå vidvåµso bhaik∑acaryåµ caranta˙/ 
sËryadvåreˆa te virajå˙ prayånti, yatråm®ta˙ sa puru∑o hy avyayåtmå// 
Wallowing in ignorance time and again, the fools imagine, “We have reached our aim!” 
Because of their passion, they do not understand, these people who are given to rites. 
Therefore, they fall, wretched and forlorn, when their heavenly stay comes to a close. 
Deeming sacrifices and gifts as the best, the imbeciles know nothing better. When they 
have enjoyed their good work, atop the firmament, they return again to this abject world. 
But those in the wilderness, calm and wise, who live a life of penance and faith, as they 
beg their food; through the sun's door they go, spotless, to where that immortal Person is, 
that immutable self. 
 
Scepticism with regard to the Vedic sacrifice does not stop with the late-Vedic Upani∑ads. The 
Bhagavadg¥tå — in which the supreme Brahma plays an important role, and which refers to its 
chapters in the colophons as Upani∑ad (Schreiner, 1991: 234) — is a particularly prominent 
example of such continued criticism, as scholars have repeatedly observed (e.g. Sarup, 1921: 75; 
                                                
101 Cp. Sarup, 1921: Introduction pp. 71-80 (“Early anti-Vedic scepticism”). 
102 Cp. Bodewitz, 1973: 211-338 (“Agnihotra and Pråˆågnihotra”). 
103 ChånUp 5.10; BÓrUp 6.2.15-16. 
104 MuˆUp 1.2.9-11; text and tr. Olivelle, 1998: 440-41. 
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Lamotte, 1929: 105; references to Bhag 2.42-46; 9.20-21; 11.48, 53).105 Critical gåthås and ßlokas 
have been preserved, which have been studied by Paul Horsch (1966: esp. p. 468 ff.). All this 
shows that it is far from evident that the Upani∑adic tradition is simply the theoretical part of the 
practical tradition which led from Vedic ritual to post-Vedic ritual thought (M¥måµså). 
 Texts such as the Mahåbhårata — which in its present form is certainly more recent than 
the early Upani∑ads — demonstrate that the Vedic ritualistic tradition did continue in post-
Upani∑adic times while remaining largely unaffected by ideas about rebirth and liberation. It is 
true that these issues play an important role in the philosophical parts of this text; in the narrative 
parts, on the other hand, they are far less common. Indeed, Brockington (1998: 232) refers to the 
significance of Vedic sacrifice within the Mahåbhårata, and observes: “this is clearly a feature 
which tends to align it more with the Bråhmaˆas than with classical Hinduism”. The concepts of 
karma and saµsåra do occasionally appear in the narrative books, beside various other 
determinants of human destiny (ibid., p. 244 f.), but they do not play the important role which 
they should be expected to play if we assume that the Vedic tradition had accepted these concepts 
from the days of the early Upani∑ads onward. Hopkins, citing a passage from the Íåntiparvan, 
paraphrases (1901: 186): “The priest, orthodox, is recognized as still striving for heaven and 
likely to go to hell, in the old way.”106 There can be no doubt that the Brahmins made fun of in 
this passage are not Vedåntins in their heart of hearts. 
 Second, if it is true that the speculative (or theoretical) sides of the early scholarly activity 
which led to Uttaram¥måµså was recorded in the (later) Upani∑ads, one might expect to find the 
names of the authorities cited in the BrahmasËtra in those Upani∑ads. However, none of these 
cited names occur in the surviving Upani∑ads, as we can learn from Vishva Bandhu's Vedic 
Word-Concordance (VWC). Most of them do occur in the KalpasËtras (as shown by Parpola). Do 
we have to assume that these names occurred in later Upani∑ads that are now lost? or in other pre-
BrahmasËtra “Vedåntic” texts that are now lost? The uncomfortable fact is that we have plenty of 
independent evidence pertaining to the ritualistic activity of the authorities cited in the ritual 
M¥måµsåsËtra, but none whatsoever with regard to their Vedåntic interests. To be more precise, 
we know from independent sources that the authorities cited in the BrahmasËtra were interested 
in ritual, but we have not one bit of independent evidence that they were interested in Vedåntic 
thought and concerns. 
 
The above reflections call for another way of looking at the teacher quotations in the 
                                                
105 Peter Schreiner (1991: 142) observes: “Die Tatsache, dass der Text (= Bhagavadg¥tå) Zitate aus einer Upani∑ad 
enthält (2.19-20, vgl. Ka†ha-Upani∑ad 2.20 und 2.19 [i.e., 2.19 and 2.18 in Olivelle's edition]) unterstreicht, dass der 
Text in einer Tradition steht und, so darf man annehmen, sich dieser Tradition bewusst zuordnet.” 
106 Cp. Mhbh 12.192.14-15: nirayaµ naiva yåtåsi yatra yåtå dvijar∑abhå˙/ yåsyasi brahmaˆa˙ sthånam animittam 
aninditam/ 
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BrahmasËtra. We have seen that one branch of later Vedåntic thinkers (Ía∫kara, Maˆ∂ana Mißra 
and others) took great pain to show that their discipline is really a form — the best form — of 
M¥måµså, that they applied the methods and techniques of M¥måµså with even more rigour than 
the ritualist M¥måµsakas. The BrahmasËtra belongs to this branch of Vedåntic thought. As such, 
the BrahmasËtra had to justify its teachings by invoking the same authorities as the ritual 
M¥måµsåsËtra.107 That is to say, it did not wish to proclaim a different discipline based on the 
teachings of different authorities, because this would suggest, or even imply, that the 
BrahmasËtra belonged to a different tradition, just as the teachings of Kapila (Såµkhya) and of 
Gautama (Nyåya) constitute different traditions. By basing itself on the same authorities as the 
ritual M¥måµsåsËtra and using the same exegetical principles, the BrahmasËtra presents itself as 
teaching the same M¥måµså, only better. Teaching M¥måµså better means, of course, that in the 
BrahmasËtra due attention is given to the statements about Brahma in the Upani∑ads. This in its 
turn, the Vedåntic M¥måµsakas claim, is a necessary consequence of the correct application of 
the rules of M¥måµså. 
 This does not necessarily imply that all the references to authorities in the BrahmasËtra 
are bogus. It is certainly conceivable that early ‘Uttaram¥måµsakas’ made major efforts to extend 
the views of ritual authorities so as to make them applicable to Vedåntic thought and procedures, 
to draw new conclusions out of their old positions. The unfortunate truth is that we have 
practically no evidence to come to anything approaching certainty in this regard. The wellnigh 
impossible style of the BrahmasËtra108 itself — which, as Rüping (1977: 2) points out, may well 
have been cultivated on purpose109 — prevents us in most cases from being sure that this text 
itself ascribes Vedåntic positions to these ritual authorities. 
                                                
107 Already Renou (1962: 197 [623]) wondered: “Dans quelle mesure ces attributions sont-elles réelles, dans quelle 
mesure s'agit-il de fictions destinées à rendre un exposé plus vivant?” 
108 Renou (1962: 202 [628]) characterizes it as follows: “Cette économie aboutit souvent à l'ellipse. Si chez Påˆini 
rien d'essentiel n'est omis qui ne puisse se reconstituer par les [sËtra] précédents ou en faisant appel aux adhikåra, ici 
dans les [BrahmasËtra] il arrive que des mots importants manquent, ceux-là même dont la définition est en cause. 
Ainsi le mot brahman est omis partout ...”; and again (1961: 197 [553]): “Les [sËtra] du Vedånta ... ont une teneur 
elliptique qui, le plus souvent, défie la compréhension directe.” Already Thibaut (1890/1896: I: xiii-xiv) complained: 
“The two M¥måµså-sËtras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All SËtras aim at 
conciseness ... . At the same time the manifest intention of the SËtra writers is to express themselves with as much 
clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. ... Altogether different is the case of the two M¥måµså-
sËtras. There scarcely one single SËtra is intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habitually 
dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the subject or predicate of a 
sentence.” 
109 Similarly Renou, 1961: 206 [562]: “On est donc conduit à penser que l'auteur des [BrahmasËtra] a cherché à 
restreindre l'intelligibilité, au-delà même de ce que se permet d'habitude le style en sËtra.”; et Renou, 1942: 122 [444, 
328]: “[Les sËtra des deux M¥måµså sont] elliptiques ... et apparemment dédaigneux de faciliter au lecteur 
l'intelligence du texte. La concision dans les deux M¥måµså, qui conduit à supprimer des éléments essentiels et 
amoindrit en fait l'intelligibilité ... est aux antipodes de la concision påˆinéenne, où tout ce qui importe est formulé.” 
Cp. already Deussen, 1883/1923: 28: “Dieser Thatbestand der Brahma-sûtra's lässt sich weder aus dem Streben nach 
Kürze, noch aus einer Vorliebe für charakteristische Ausdrucksweise hinlänglich erklären. Vielmehr müssen wir 
annehmen, dass der oder die Verfasser absichtlich das Dunkle suchten, um ihr die Geheimlehre des Veda 
behandelndes Werk allen denen unzugänglich zu machen, welchen es nicht durch die Erklärungen eines Lehrers 
erschlossen wurde.” 
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 And yet, a closer look at the positions ascribed to Jaimini in the BrahmasËtra110 shows that 
these ascribed views are often very close to positions known to be held by the ritual 
M¥måµsakas. This may indicate that the BrahmasËtra occasionally mentions the name of Jaimini 
in order to present a ritual M¥måµså view which it then rejects. The conclusion that Jaimini must 
have been a Vedåntin of sorts may in that case have to be abandoned. 
 Consider first BrahmasËtra 1.3.31 which mentions the name of Jaimini. The sËtra reads: 
madhvådi∑v asaµbhavåd anadhikåraµ jaimini˙; it stands out, in comparison with many other 
sËtras in the same text, by the relative clarity of its formulation. It is yet difficult to determine, on 
the basis of these words alone, what this sËtra means. If we assume that Ía∫kara was aware of the 
intention of the sËtra, and that we are therefore entitled to invoke his help, we may then translate: 
“On account of the impossibility [on the part of the gods to be qualified to knowledge] with 
regard to honey etc., Jaimini [thinks that the gods] are not qualified [to knowledge of Brahma].” 
According to the editions of Ía∫kara's commentary, sËtra 1.3.31 is part of the Devatådhikaraˆa, 
which covers sËtras 1.3.26-33. None of these sËtras, to be sure, contains any indication that this 
section is concerned with gods or with the qualification to knowledge of Brahma, so it is 
probably impossible to confirm that Ía∫kara's understanding of sËtra 1.3.31 is correct.111 
Assuming nonetheless that it is, some interesting observations can be made. We know from 
Íabara's Bhå∑ya on M¥måµsåsËtra 6.1.5 that gods are not qualified to perform Vedic rites. The 
statement from Íabara concerned, na devånåµ devatåntaråbhåvåt, is even cited by Ía∫kara in the 
beginning of the Devatådhikaraˆa (on BrahmasËtra 1.3.26). M¥måµsåsËtra 6.1.5 itself, though 
rather obscure, can be understood to express the same position.112 The position presumably 
attributed to Jaimini in BrahmasËtra 1.3.31 may therefore very well be an extension of the view 
held by the “real” Jaimini, i.e., by the author of M¥måµsåsËtra 6.1.5. It certainly is an extension 
of what Íabara — and perhaps others before him — believed was Jaimini's view. 
 It is less obvious that the reason given in BrahmasËtra 1.3.31 corresponds to anything 
Jaimini may have ever thought of. According to Ía∫kara, the words madhvådi∑v asaµbhavåd 
“On account of the impossibility [on the part of the gods to be qualified to knowledge] with 
regard to honey etc.” refer to Chåndogya Upani∑ad 3.1.1 asau vå ådityo devamadhu “The honey 
of the gods, clearly, is the sun up there” (tr. Olivelle, 1998: 201). The interpretation which, 
according to Ía∫kara, Jaimini gives of this statement is that human beings should worship the sun 
by superimposing the idea of honey on it (manu∑yå ådityaµ madhvadhyåsenopås¥ran). No such 
                                                
110 Cp. Kane, 1960: 126 f.; HistDh 5(2), p. 1162 f.; and Taber's contribution to this volume. 
111 The sËtras read: tadupary api bådarayaˆa˙ saµbhavåt (26); virodha˙ karmaˆ¥ti cen nånekapratipatter darßanåt 
(27); ßabda iti cen nåta˙ prabhavåt pratyak∑ånumånåbhyåm (28); ata eva ca nityatvam (29); samånanåmarËpatvåc 
cåv®ttåv apy avirodho darßanåt sm®teß ca (30); madhvådi∑v asaµbhavåd anadhikåraµ jaimini˙ (31); jyoti∑i bhåvåc ca 
(32); bhåvaµ tu bådaråyaˆo 'sti hi (33). 
112 PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra 6.1.5 reads: kartur vå ßrutisaµyogåd vidhi˙ kårtsnyena gamyate, which Jha (1933: II: 973) 
translates, or rather paraphrases: “In reality, the injunction of an act should be taken to apply to only such an agent as 
may be able to carry out the entire details of the act; because such is the sense of the Vedic texts.” 
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interpretation is found in Ía∫kara's commentary on the Chåndogya Upani∑ad. And it is very 
surprising to find such an interpretation attributed to Jaimini. From the point of view of ritual 
M¥måµså this is a simple arthavåda. And Ía∫kara himself, under the immediately following sËtra 
1.3.32, presents Jaimini's ideas about arthavådas as follows: arthavådå api vidhinaikavåkyatvåt 
stutyarthå˙ santo na pårthagarthyena devåd¥nåµ vigrahådisadbhåve kåraˆabhåvaµ pratipadyante 
“Arthavådas, too, having as purpose to praise [an activity] on account of the fact that they are to 
be understood in connection with an injunction, are no independent (pårthagarthyena) grounds for 
[accepting] that the gods etc. have bodies and so on”. This is indeed the position of ritual 
M¥måµså, and this same reasoning might be used to refuse drawing conclusions from the 
statement from the the Chåndogya Upani∑ad on which Jaimini is yet supposed to base his 
conclusion that the gods are not qualified to knowledge. 
 Jaimini is again mentioned in BrahmasËtra 3.2.40: dharmaµ jaiminir ata eva.113 Ía∫kara 
interprets this to mean that in Jaimini's opinion not God (¥ßvara) but Dharma, or ApËrva, links the 
sacrificial activity with its result. This agrees with what we know from Íabara's Bhå∑ya, and sËtra 
3.2.40 may therefore correctly represent Jaimini's opinion without obliging us to conclude that 
Jaimini was (also) a Vedåntin. 
 Jaimini's mention in BrahmasËtra 4.4.11 (bhåvaµ jaiminir vikalpåmananåt)114 is at first 
sight more problematic, for it concerns — at least in Ía∫kara's interpretation — the question 
whether a liberated soul still has a body and organs; according to Jaimini, it does. Far from 
concluding from this sËtra that Jaimini had ideas about the state of liberation, it seems much more 
prudent to read no more in it than an extension of the ritual M¥måµså idea that sacrificers will 
remain in possession of body and organs in the state which they strive to attain above all, viz. 
heaven. 
 Jaimini defends the subordinate nature of knowledge of the self in BrahmasËtra 3.4.2115 (in 
Ía∫kara's interpretation) and the non-injunction of other stages of life (åßrama) in sËtra 3.4.18116 
(again according to Ía∫kara), both times in opposition to Bådaråyaˆa, and both times in 
agreement with ritual M¥måµså doctrine. 
 Let it here once more be repeated that the obscure formulation of the BrahmasËtra makes 
any study of its contents extremely difficult. Few would be more qualified than Parpola to study 
                                                
113 Modi (1943?: 77) translates: “Jaimini [says that the fruit is] Dharma (religious merit), because of this very reason 
(viz., the support of the Íruti).” 
114 Modi (1943?: 441) translates: “Jaimini holds that there is existence of a body in his case, because of the mention 
in the Íruti of an option regarding the number of bodies of a liberated soul.” 
115 BraSË 3.4.2: ße∑atvåt puru∑årthavådo yathånye∑v iti jaimini˙. Tr. Modi, 1943?: 242: “‘The name of the aim of 
human life is applied [to the goal of the Lore of the Upani∑ads] because that knowledge is subsidiary [to the 
sacrifice] as is the case with other knowledges or othe puru∑årthas’, so says Jaimini.” 
116 BraSË 3.4.18: paråmarßaµ jaiminir acodanå cåpavadati hi. Modi (1943?: 252) translates: “Jaimini holds the 
knowledge of Brahman to be a thought; and [he says] ‘It is not of the form of an Injunction, because the Scripture 
denies all actions [as a help to the realization of Brahman]’.” 
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the extent to which the opinions attributed to the various teachers in this text can be looked upon 
as extensions of what we know about them from elsewhere, but unfortunately his articles almost 
completely abandon the BrahmasËtra after the challenging initial remarks. The observations 
about Jaimini presented above are however suggestive. They suggest indeed that Jaimini in the 
BrahmasËtra, far from being the name of an individual who had outspoken ideas about Vedånta, 
stands there for a collection of views which agree more or less well with the ritual M¥måµså 
position. Something similar may be true for the remaining teachers whose names are cited in the 
BrahmasËtra. Unfortunately this will have to remain a hypothesis as long as the BrahmasËtra 
remains almost completely unintelligible. 
 
The view that the BrahmasËtra made an effort to show itself to be a M¥måµså text that does not 
in any essential aspect deviate from classical M¥måµså can explain various other features as well. 
The BrahmasËtra refers on some occasions to M¥måµså rules, which it obviously accepts. 
M¥måµsaka (1987: Intr. p. 7) illustrates this with a number of examples,117 but points out that no 
borrowing of rules has taken place in the opposite direction, from BrahmasËtra to ritual 
M¥måµsåsËtra. He concludes from this that the names PËrvam¥måµså and Uttaram¥måµså are 
appropriate, no doubt in the meanings of earlier and later M¥måµså respectively. Whatever one 
thinks of this interpretation (which differs widely from the one proposed by Parpola), it is clear 
that Uttaram¥måµså was influenced by and followed the example of PËrvam¥måµså, but not 
vice-versa. This of course agrees with our suggestion that the thinkers of Uttaram¥måµså went 
out of their way to show their teaching to be an improved version of ritual M¥måµså. The 
extensive use made by Ía∫kara of M¥måµså principles (Devasthali, 1952; Moghe, 1984) points 
in the same direction. 
 Seen in the way here suggested the BrahmasËtra and its early commentaries are the 
embodiment of the attempt to lend the respectibility of serious Vedic interpretation to the 
speculations about Brahma which had continued without interruption since Upani∑adic times. 
Such respectibility so far only belonged to the (PËrva-)M¥måµså. By basing all their doctrines on 
properly interpreted Upani∑adic statements, the speculations about Brahma became a form of 
M¥måµså, even a better form of M¥måµså than the ritualistic one. Some traces of non-m¥måµsic 
Vedåntic thought have however survived, allowing us to see that post-Vedic Vedåntic philosophy 
had not always been a form of M¥måµså (e.g., Uttaram¥måµså, Íår¥raka M¥måµså, etc.). 
 
 
                                                
117 See further Subrahmanya Sastri, 1961: BhËmikå p. 2 f.; Renou, 1962: 195 [621] n. 2. 
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§6.  Conclusions 
 
It will be clear from the preceding reflections that Uttaram¥måµså, far from being part of original 
M¥måµså, attached itself at some time to it in order to provide speculations about Brahma with 
the solid underpinning of serious Vedic interpretation. Speculations about Brahma, more or less 
continuing the ideas found in the Vedic Upani∑ads, had been around probably without 
interruption since Upani∑adic times. They had not always profited from the sophisticated 
instruments of Vedic interpretation that had been developed in M¥måµså for the sake of Vedic 
ritual. Using these instruments to solidly ancre Vedåntic ideas into the eternal Veda was an aim 
that gave rise to a new — or perhaps better: supplementary — school of Vedic interpretation: the 
Uttaram¥måµså. 
 This way of looking at the historical origins of Uttaram¥måµså does away with the need 
to believe that the early ritual M¥måµsakas — Íabara, but also Jaimini, and even the authorities 
cited in the SËtra — were really convinced Vedåntins, who believed in liberation from this world 
as a possibility beside and above the rewards offered for Vedic ritual practice. It is no longer 
necessary to think that Íabara, in spite of showing no awareness whatsoever of the notion of 
liberation in his massive commentary on the M¥måµså SËtra, yet was familiar with it and may 
therefore himself have hoped to attain liberation one day. We can now stick to the far simpler and 
far more plausible position that Íabara — and Jaimini, and all those they cite — never mention 
liberation because they did not believe in it. They did not believe in it because there was no place 
for liberation in their vision of the world which was in this respect still rather close to, and 
continued, the Vedic ritualistic world view. This in its turn constitutes evidence that Vedic 
Brahmins had not, from the time of the Upani∑ads onward, embraced the new ideas of karmic 
retribution and liberation. Far from it, the most conservative among them continued to resist these 
ideas for at least one thousand years, from the time of the early Upani∑ads until that of Íabara and 
Prabhåkara. We can now also understand how later ritual M¥måµsakas — prominent among 
them Kumårila Bha††a — could no longer resist the lure of the notion of liberation and yielded to 
it without becoming Vedåntins. From the point of view of ritual M¥måµså the two M¥måµsås 
were not fundamentally one, and had never been one. Vedånta had attached itself to the older 
school of Vedic interpretation, claiming that it had always been part of it; that ritual M¥måµså 
had never been complete without it. The ritual M¥måµsakas knew better, and historically 
speaking they were right. 
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